the ALTERNATIVE: AN AMERICAN SPECTATOR

George S. Kaufman and Friends
by Christopher Buckley

Eugene V. Rostow Assesses
The Nixon-Kissinger-Ford Foreign Policy

Tom Charles Huston Comments on
The Late, Great Nixon White House

Aug./Sept. 1975 • Volume 8, Number 10 • Price (.40)

Eminentoes



by J. Whitney Stillman

Millicent H. Fenwick: Reality in Our Time

("The Continuing Crisis" has not been discontinued! It will return next issue, and in the meantime we introduce a delectable new column devoted to honoring the eminent personalities of our day.)

One of the architects of the orderly transfer of power in Indochina was Mrs. Millicent H. Fenwick, freshman Republican Representative from New Jersey's Fifth Congressional District. Mrs. Fenwick became a heroine for many Americans when in March 1975—upon return from the Congressional fact-finding mission to Cambodia and South Vietnam—she said that U.S. military aid would "only delay the development of the kind of stable situation—whatever form that takes—that will at least stop the horrible suffering of war. We have no alternative."

Fortunately, Congress followed Mrs. Fenwick's counsel, delaying aid and, thus, bringing the war to a peaceful conclusion. But it had no alternative. As Mrs. Fenwick observed, the only remaining question was "how to achieve an orderly transfer of power, and the basic reality is China." This frank recognition of political realities could be termed *Realpolitik*, only this article isn't written in German.

Although the fighting stopped soon after Mrs. Fenwick's return from Asia, it remained uncertain exactly what form the stabilization would take, particularly in Cambodia. Basically there are three forms of government—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—so it can be assumed that Cambodia will ultimately settle on one of them. Mrs. Fenwick has written that in Cambodia "the basic reality is China." China is a democracy, so it seems likely that Cambodia will choose to follow that governmental system.

The final solution to the Cambodia crisis was also anticipated by Mrs. Fenwick in March: "The obvious hope is Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and he recently sent a cable to the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, offering friendly relations with the United States and amnesty to all Cambodians except Marshal Lon Nol and his closest advisers. This could be the start of a controlled and stable situation." She cautioned that further military aid to the Lon Nol government "would be useless and might, in fact, be misunderstood as continuing support for Lon Nol and a rebuff to Prince Sihanouk."

Congress wisely forebore from any action which could have been misconstrued as a rebuff to Prince Sihanouk. The benefits of this policy were quick to be reaped. No sooner had Prince Sihanouk returned to power than he was seeking to re-establish friendly relations with the United States, and within little more than a month there were Cambodian initiatives to share with the U.S. its merchant fleet. It is hoped that the way will soon be open for documentaries of Cambodian life by some of our prominent American actresses.

The so-called bloodbath, much discussed by right-wingers in this country, never materialized. Cambodians—except for the corrupt Lon Nol and his 300,000 closest advisers—have had nothing to fear from the Khmer Rouge. In fact the new Cambodian regime has been busy putting into action an innovative plan to solve its country's urban crisis—a plan which might well be imitated by our own policy makers. Admittedly, there have been some causes for sadness in Cambodia. In Lon Nol, the world lost not only a well-known head of state, but also a valuable palindrome.

Mrs. Fenwick found the situation in South Vietnam similar to that in Cambodia—only no Prince Sihanouk, no Mike Mansfield. The fact-finding mission, she observed, "was a sobering, highly educational, experience." All the South Vietnamese she spoke with, including members of the political opposition, were vehemently opposed to the Communists. "But," she added, "the lesson here is that it must be their choice—not ours." The surprise was considerable when, less than a month later, the South Vietnamese chose Communism.

The Indochinese war has taught Americans many lessons. First, the United States shouldn't allow itself to become embroiled in a war involving a foreign country. Second, aid to our allies—when they are losing—can only prolong the suffering. Third, there is a preponderance of liberals in Asia. It is important that these and other lessons the war taught are remembered in the future. All in all, the Southeast Asian war has been a sobering, highly educational experience.

Surprisingly, Mrs. Fenwick's own formal education ended at finishing school. Yet political support for her has come from some of the most enlightened quarters. In November 1974, the *New York Times* editorially endorsed Mrs. Fenwick's Congressional candidacy, citing a long record of social concern (her debut was in 1929). In fact, this very social concern played an important role in her decision to advocate an end to Indochina aid. The American people, she said, would not and should not finance such a continuing commitment overseas. "We have many problems at home that need attention," she argued. Before her election to Congress, as director of the State of New Jersey's bureau of consumer affairs, Mrs. Fenwick sought to help her state's shoppers economize. She is an educated consumer.

And Mrs. Fenwick has continued to demonstrate her capacity to learn, an important asset in politics. As probably the most serious student of global realities on the Republican side of the aisle in the House of Representatives, she will have a major role whichever direction her party takes—either toward a broadened base or a greater ideological purity. In the 1960s, another member of the House, Melvin Laird, was elevated to the Cabinet. Should the world situation deteriorate radically, perhaps Mrs. Fenwick will find a Secretaryship of State in the offing.

Mrs. Fenwick would at least bring a heart to the State Department. She feels that social concern is not something which stops at national boundaries. In a House speech last March, she observed: "In an era of increasing interdependence, we as a people are more and more affected by the results of global problems.... Events in developing countries thousands of miles away, which ten years ago would have been of only passing interest to us, today may mean the difference between prosperity and hard times." With scarcely muffled emotion, Mrs. Fenwick declared: "We Americans have always been a generous people.... It is difficult to understand, given this overwhelming sentiment of the American people... why we should h[illegible] Appropriations Subcommittee [illegible]ng for massive cutbacks in U.S. foreign aid." She appealed to her Congressional colleagues on moral or religious grounds: "We are only asked to give the crumbs that fall from our table. It is not a big cut in what we have. It is the crumbs from our table."

"Lithuania" is probably one of the last words the reader would expect to encounter at this point. But Lithuania was

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Editorial/R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

Politicians: Rhapsodies on a Theme

"The People's Right to Know" is one of the trendy sonorities of the 1970s that has hung on long enough to sprout whiskers and be welcomed into that assemblage of dubious notions that we so hastily transmute into American dogma. It is one of those tenets that is supposed to inspire goose pimples in all decent Americanoes; Latin translations of it will soon be engraved on coins of the realm and chiseled over the doorways of government buildings, newspaper establishments, libraries, university auditoria, gymnasia, and those Washington massage parlors frequented by Congressmen and educators. It is the kind of statement that makes every prehensile pol's mind turn to visions of incense and blessed oils. Nonetheless to me it is gibberish and embarrassing gibberish at that. I may have a right to know, but, verily, if it is all the same to you, I would rather not—indeed, I believe most thoughtful persons would rather not.

Too often those news stories and broadcasts attempting to illumine the behavior of our contemporary Jeffersons and Madisons are mere embarrassments. In my opinion, the electorate should proscribe newspapers from publishing the texts of Presidential bulls. Television should be barred from broadcasting the political diatribes and whines of our would-be Daniel Websters. We should adjudge interviews with them as outrages to public decency, unfit for polite society, and injurious to innocent children and to maidens. The *Congressional Record* should be expurgated, probably by old-line Jesuits. All of this I can say without any fear for my libertarian credentials, credentials that I maintain with a solicitude that is practically religious in its devotion. I yield to no man in my love of liberty; I merely feel that the polity and the civilization would be much improved —much freer—were it free from the incessant gusts of imbecilities and deceits that regularly issue from our elected and appointed government panjandrums. They have degraded Shakespeare's tongue to the point that it is now no more communicative than the patter of jungle drums. They are ill-mannered. They are congenital liars. America would be better off if it were ignorant of their doings—especially in light of the fact that Americans seem to have little or no control over said doings.

For years Americans of all races have opposed the shipment of their children to the farthest reaches of the land merely to fulfill racial quotas, but the busing goes on. Americans in large numbers oppose the *noblesse oblige* approach to miscreants, yet our most vicious criminals are still treated as though they were an endangered species and our government spends more to comfort them than it spends to educate our astrophysicists or brain surgeons. The average American longs for the day when we can again roast cold-blooded murderers, rapists, and other such scoundrels, yet reinstatement of an economical and expeditious form of capital punishment remains but an idealistic phantasma, inspiring the personal Utopias of all the decent and enlightened citizens of the Republic. Americans are opposed to higher taxes and to increased government expenditures, yet they are nipped steadily. Such a list could run for many pages, and the documentation would be voluminous, but there is no reason to bore knowledgeable readers with the obvious. The American citizenry has little control over its legislators. It is hoodwinked or thwarted at every turn, and we would all be immeasurably improved if we simply did not know what they are up to. Hypocrisy and arrant deceits practiced *pro forma* in political life are one thing; were they to spread and be emulated in other areas of society, life would be intolerable. By continually publicizing politicians we may be encouraging the frail in our midst to stray from the paths of virtue, a dangerous business to say the least.

As a rule the American pol's locutions are either so blatantly dishonest as to be corrosive to the public virtue or so ignorant as to be embarrassing to intelligent citizens. I simply cannot fathom how the general dissemination of such utterances benefits us. Consider the Rt. Hon. Jerry Ford's widely publicized debate with Congress during those sad weeks when South Vietnam and Cambodia slipped further into the dark ages. Was he really serious about redeeming the military situation? If so, that plea for $722 million was as futile a tactic as a plea for a million slingshots. If he was unserious, I would rather be spared his histrionics.

Regarding those in-depth portrayals of a politician's life, I would rather not hear how Senator Teddy Kennedy loves children, pines away for the poor, is possessed of a leprechaun's waggishness, and reads the classics. The same instinct that informs me that mountain lions make unloving house pets, though I have never owned one, informs me that all this is moonshine—especially that sempiternal exaggeration regarding his abiding fondness for the poor. Professor Robert Nozick has written eloquently (in *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, Basic Books, 1974) about how the left-wing rich can convincingly manifest their thirst for "social justice" while persuading the less rich to share income with the poor. According to Professor Nozick, while Senator Kennedy is off anesthetizing the media with his grand schemes for justice and income redistribution he should donate to charity that percentage of his swag that his scheme would demand were it already law. Such private philanthropy may mean that he will have to sell one or two of his vacation retreats, cut down on those skiing and yachting jaunts, and perhaps even send his children to public schools. Nonetheless, he will have gone a long way in dispelling the suspicion that he is more serious about helping himself to publicity and to votes than in helping the poor. Until Senator Kennedy learns that charity begins at home, I would rather not know of his lifelong emulation of the Good Samaritan or even of his orgies amongst the great books of the Western World.

Nor do I wish to hear of the pols' noble desire to have increased numbers of Americans participate in political life. It is a palpable lie. If the chairman of the board of General Motors publicly proclaimed his desire to see more Japanese automobiles imported, I would find him more credible than the blowzy pol who rises up to massage us with his reverie that more and more Americans enter politics. Recently the new Harding intoned exactly this theme, and no sooner had he unburdened himself of the hope that all Americans would swarm into the empty halls of the Republican Party than he was met by a chorus of fury from conservatives who felt a political party should be something other than an assembly of joiners. The conservatives need not have worried. I have perceived no serious effort from the Republican hierarchy to bring new people or ideas into the Great Hall of the Pachyderm. And how could they? How could any political grandee maintain his sinecure if the majority of intelligent Americans were to compete earnestly in the political system? Would Nelson Rockefeller really want, say, Daniel Patrick Moynihan to compete for his laurels? If so, it is an infant desire, for at no point in his public life has Mr. Rockefeller encouraged competition. Years ago when an average citizen by the name of James Buckley became interested in New York's political process, politicians like Governor Rockefeller and Senator Javits treated the matter as though it were a scandal and an indiscretion. Are the Republican pols really serious about encouraging the working man to join their ranks? The Democrats have had the working man's company for years and even now they are quietly designing ways to lay George Meany low. When the politician says he wants wider participation he means he wants more votes. He is at one with those gurus who have recently disembarked from the exotic Orient proclaiming their intention to refurbish American spirits even as they empty American pockets.

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Special Book Review/Tom Charles Huston

Surviving the Fall

William Safire's memoir of his service in the Nixon Administration should be distinguished from the Watergate volumes that have appeared and that will be forthcoming. It is not so much a product of Watergate as a victim.

Safire commenced his book the day he signed on with Nixon for the Come Back, and he worked on it continouously during his tenure at the White House, taking careful notes, snitching sensitive memoranda, and catching the "color" of the place with the pen he employed as camera. A book was largely finished prior to the collapse of the Nixon Presidency, and wading through the nearly seven hundred pages of the published volume, one catches glimpses of what it would have been like if Safire had not learned that his telephone had been tapped at the apparent direction of Henry Kissinger and if he had not felt compelled by the disclosures of Watergate to compensate for his instinctive pro-Nixon tilt by weaving self-righteous libertarian sonority into the narrative. Perhaps from a commercial point of view, publication of *Before the Fall* in the wake of Watergate was fortunate, but a good book could easily have been an infinitely better one if it had been published when Safire was in the dark about the darkest side of Richard Nixon.

Somewhere between the first draft and publication he succumbed to the backlash of Watergate, reappraising his subject with an eye blurred if not blinded by the hysteria of the witchhunters. The unfortunate result is illustrated by Safire's discussion of the Pentagon Papers controversy in the summer of 1971:

"I still think a good case can be made for opposing publication in the courts: The press should not have the power to decide what is a defense secret and what is not; we elect a government for that.... No individual should have the right to walk off with classified national security documents, to publish them in support of his own cause or for his own profit....

"In retrospect, of course, publishing the Pentagon Papers was the right and proper thing for the newspapers to do: not for the reasons then advanced, but because President Nixon was defiling the government's right to file by the improper use of 'national security' as the reason for illegal eavesdropping and burglary." (p. 357)

Safire appears to be saying in this passage that while he thinks there is a good case for the government to go to court when a newspaper seeks to publish stolen secrets, it was wrong for the government to do so at the order of President Nixon because he had defiled the legal process by the "national security" illegalities of his aides. The second paragraph, however, doesn't follow logically from the first. Having told us who should decide what is a state secret, i.e., the elected government, he then tells us that "[i]n retrospect" his present employer was right to publish the Pentagon Papers, not because the *New York Times* has finally been elected to determine what is a state secret, but because Bob Haldeman ordered an FBI check on Daniel Schorr, John Ehrlichman approved a "covert operation" in Dr. Fielding's office, and Henry Kissinger put Safire's name on his electronic surveillance list. These may be good reasons to have run Nixon out of town on a rail, but they are hardly good reasons to give *carte blanche* to the *New York Times* to traffic in stolen secrets.

Before the Fall

by William Safire
Doubleday $12.50

A post-Watergate book is of a genre characterized by "finger-pointing," a less subtle version of the traditional insider's exposition of what would have happened "if only the President had listened to me." Safire points the finger at Kissinger who "cannot escape history's judgment of the way he watered the roots of Watergate"; Haldeman who "enjoyed the play of power too much... [and] deserves a great deal of the blame"; Huston who "placed the knife on the table"; and Mitchell "who played the 'heavy,' who most insiders were sure was really *not* the heavy, but who really *was* a heavy." His characterizations in context are generally charitable by contemporary standards, but his unseemly and frequent *ad hominem* attacks on Jeb Magruder are on a level with the bushwhacking technique of Gore Vidal. He variously describes Magruder as "boot-licking," "a man of mirrors," and a fellow to whom "buck-passing and back-stabbing was standard procedure," and having read Jeb's account of the infamous 1970 election eve television broadcast of the Safire-edited tape of Nixon's Phoenix speech, I can understand his chagrin. Yet the cheap shot is not generally Safire's style, and I can't imagine what satisfaction a man of decent instincts can derive from using his pen as an ax to clobber the disarmed. Perhaps not only Nixon but all of us have a dark side.

Although crippled by Watergate, *Before the Fall* is nevertheless destined to be one of the dozen books about the Nixon Presidency to which serious men will turn when that time comes, as surely it must, for a fresh look at the man who opened the door to normalization of relations with China, closed the door on war in Vietnam, and cracked the door for the flow of power from Washington to the states and localities. Safire deals with each of these major breakthroughs and while his accounts are not definitive, they are indispensable to understanding what happened and how it happened and useful in understanding why it happened.

The distinctions between what, how, and why are critical ones in appraising the importance of this book. Safire wisely observes that "[t]o 'know your place' is a good idea in politics," yet he never quite knew whether his place was that of Boswell or Johnson, failing to sense that

while the talents of each were formidable, they were nevertheless dissimilar and not to be dissipated on doing poorly what the other did well. He chose the role "of sloganeering philosopher, or creative interpreter," a role he played less well than he supposes. Fortunately, he also assumed the role of "camera" and in telling it like he heard and saw it, he has played the role ably. His word pictures of the tension between Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers, of the struggle between the President and the bureaucracy over the relocation of Navy personnel, of the interplay between the draftsmen of Presidential words and the President who speaks them, and of the contrast between a compassionate President reaching out to his critics at dawn on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and a vindictive President scratching the names of two of his most tenured aides from the guest list for his daughter's wedding show us more of the man and the institution than all the reels of Oval Office tapes. Safire's slogans will be forgotten, but men will long turn to his book to learn what happened and how it happened, so that with the benefit of additional sources—most significantly, one hopes, Richard Nixon's own recollections—they may understand why it happened.

II.

If you merge an author who is enamoured with every word that flows from his pen with a publisher who figures he can price his book by the pound, you end up with a volume that is hefty, expensive, saturated with trivia, and marred by errors great and small. Safire's editors would have been wise to scissor seventy thousand words or so at the risk of knocking a couple of dollars off the product. For example, who cares that "Bus" Mosbacher whispered to Safire that "Frenchmen wrote the book on State Dinners," that DeGaulle went to funerals because he was a gentleman, that Nixon traveled to Moscow with seven suits, that Mrs. Nixon discussed with Kosygin the sexual composition of Congress, or that on June 29, 1969, Flanigan, Safire, Borman, and Chapin decided that a Bible—"Both Testaments"—would go to the moon with the crew of Apollo XI? Is it really important to posterity whether Kissinger was "a Lothario" or that the women whose opinion Safire respects say Henry the K "is an attractive, if shy dinner partner"?

The fly-specking errors in the book may be quickly dismissed as inconsequential (e.g., Safire's office was Room 124 of the Old EOB, not Room 125 [and Abe Lincoln never kept an office there—construction of the building didn't commence until 1871]; the late Senator Ellender's first name was Allen, not Carl; and the present reviewer is wiry, not cadaverous), but errors of significant historical fact ought to be corrected.

Safire writes (p. 86) that "In 1960, Nixon had blown his lead to Kennedy, but then came back to nearly even in the final week." I had made essentially the same observation in a memorandum to Nixon in March of 1968, noting that RN had lost his "commanding August lead" over Kennedy. But RN was not amused and corrected me: "One bit of mythology which should not be included in future discussions of 1960, is that we had a commanding lead over Kennedy in August. This was something the Kennedy people put out in Teddy White's book after the fact and, of course, has no foundation. The polls from the time Congress adjourned in August until the election did not vary from either 51-49 Nixon or 51-49 Kennedy—except for one aberration by Gallup two weeks before the end of the campaign in which he showed 53-47 Kennedy, a figure which obviously had been stimulated by the Kennedy press and which Gallup with good judgment corrected the following week when he found that his own surveys did not bear out the figure. In other words, the election was a close contest from the beginning and there was no great spread between the candidates at any time. Since Roper pointed this out in an extensive article written after Teddy White's book came out, it would be well for Huston to put this in the back of his mind so that he does not fall into the error of repeating the mythology which those who managed Kennedy's campaign like to perpetuate."

Safire also asserts that Lyndon Johnson tried to make a deal with the North Vietnamese in Paris in time to influence the 1968 election; according to Safire a crippled President was "manipulating foreign policy for political ends against a political deadline" (pp. 56, 90-91). This was certainly assumed by Nixon (and apparently his staff) to be true, but I don't believe it is. In September of 1969 the President requested that I prepare a report on the events leading up to the October 31, 1968 bombing halt and it took nearly two years to complete the project. I read most (according to State, all) of the thousands of cables between Washington and Paris, Saigon, and other capitals relating to the Paris negotiations as well as countless memoranda of conversations and other records. And though I began my review with the same presumption that Safire states as fact, I concluded it was Hanoi, not Washington, that was shooting for a pre-election deadline. I found no probative evidence that American policy was materially altered to expedite a bombing halt in time to salvage Humphrey's campaign, and while there is good reason in my judgment to be critical of the terms of the settlement, the essential terms were on the table in Paris well in advance of the campaign, and when in mid-October the North Vietnamese agreed in principle to accept them, Washington had either to go along or revoke its offer. It is also my view that Johnson had every reason to assume President Thieu would acquiesce; the problem was that LBJ's understanding with his South Vietnamese counterpart was not based on a firm understanding between President Thieu and his colleagues in the Saigon government. Under pressure at home, Thieu balked and Johnson had to choose between acting unilaterally with the expectation that Saigon would ultimately fall into line and admitting to Hanoi that the tail wagged the dog. It is possible that LBJ's decision to announce the agreement with Hanoi prior to lining up Thieu was influenced by domestic politics, but I am not convinced. He waited more than two weeks for Thieu to get his ducks in a row while he kept Le Duc Tho cooling his heels. If the final decision was politically motivated, the careerists, including Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams, supported it. I prefer to believe LBJ acted honestly in the best interest of the country as he saw it, and Safire offers no evidence to support a contrary view.

The Dragon Lady, Anna Chennault, is portrayed by Teddy White, Safire, and others as a major player in the drama of the politicization of the October 31 bombing halt decision. Actually Safire adds little that is new to the available information on this queer episode, but he does add much that is wrong. If Hoover told Nixon that Mrs. Chennault's phones had been tapped, then he either misspoke or he covered his tracks at the Bureau, for he concurred in writing with the recommendation of the Washington Field Office that a telephone tap not be installed on her residence telephone because it was too risky. Physical surveillance of Mrs. Chennault was instituted as the President ordered, but I am convinced Hoover ignored LBJ's order for a wire tap because he understood better than Mitchell the risk of placing a tap at the Watergate where Mrs. Chennault resided.

Ramsey Clark wrote Safire a letter stating that he never approved a tap on Mrs. Chennault, and Safire leaps from this disclaimer to the conclusion that there was a tap and it was illegal. Even if we assume that there was a tap, it is not clear it was

Safire's contrast between a compassionate President reaching out to his critics and a vindictive President keeping two of his most tenured aides from his daughter's wedding shows us more than all the Oval office tapes.

illegal, since it clearly involved matters of foreign intelligence, a thicket the Supreme Court recently refused to enter.

With post-Watergate insight, Safire concludes that "Mrs. Chennault had every right as an American citizen to urge other nations to do whatever she wanted them to do, which is why her surveillance was illegal.... The pattern of tapping by several agencies of government confirmed to Nixon by Hoover later, set up a 'tolerance' of this type of activity that had disastrous ramifications later" (p. 90).

There is no reason for Safire to believe as a matter of law that the surveillance of Mrs. Chennault was illegal or that she had the right to be poking her nose into sensitive matters of war and peace involving government-to-government negotiations free of surveillance of the United States Government. Lowell Weicker and Anthony Lewis do not have the last say on these matters. It is true that LBJ was not above using the FBI as his personal Pinkerton Agency, as recent revelations about the Bureau's 1964 activities clearly show; but in October of 1968 the President of the United States had reason to be concerned about sensitive peace efforts being sabotaged for partisan purposes and perhaps a right to know what was going on, for what was at stake was not an election, but a war; and he could exercise his constitutional powers as Chief Diplomat and Commander-in-Chief effectively only if he *knew* what was being urged upon a government with which he was engaged in sensitive negotiations by those who conceivably could influence those negotiations behind his back. In my judgment the propriety of the Chennault investigation is a close call; but the Constitution does contemplate that our foreign relations will be conducted by elected Presidents, not by Dragon Ladies. Safire's rush to judgment in this matter is unseemly and ill-considered.

III.

An insider's view of events is necessarily a partial one, for no single individual in government, however intimately involved in the events he is reporting, can have access to all the evidence, be familiar with all the important facts, or be aware of all the subtle factors that influence a major policy decision. The government is just too big and the issue too complex; too many people are involved at too many levels and in too many ways. Even those closest to the President do not know how much importance he attaches to a recommendation submitted or a fact emphasized or a consideration noted in the course of the decision-making process. It is a marked characteristic of Presidents that they rarely acknowledge to subordinates the influence of a particular factor in the formulation of a major decision, and quite often Presidents are themselves unable to determine the precise consideration that tipped the scales and resulted in the selection of one option as opposed to another.

In my judgment the propriety of the Chennault investigation is a close call; but the Constitution does contemplate that our foreign relations will be conducted by elected Presidents, not by dragon ladies.

In his desire to justify the dust-cover claim of an "inside view," Safire overreaches. Speechwriters are prone to assume that the struggle over the explanation accurately and fully reflects the struggle over the decision being explained. A President's preliminary drafts of a speech and off-the-cuff comments to his writers are interesting, useful, and often important indicators of how or why a decision was reached, but they are not often conclusive, or complete, and a reader would be wise to keep this in mind when reading *Before the Fall.*

The insider's account is generally a self-serving exercise. The temptation to exaggerate his own importance, to even the score with old adversaries, to vindicate, with the benefit of hindsight, his spurned advice or ignored recommendations is too great to be resisted by most inside chroniclers of political events. Lyn Nofziger had a sign on the wall of his office at the White House that could well serve as the motto of most of those who profiteer in inside information: "Don't get mad; get even!"

Safire attempts to even the score with Magruder, Kissinger, and "The True Believers" without pretense to subtlety, and if he avoids exaggerating his own importance, it is not because he fails to emphasize his personal contribution to that which was most notable (and noble) in the Nixon Administration and his firm opposition to that which was otherwise. According to Safire, Nixon had been on the right track for the issue of busing when he was listening to Safire, Garment, and Price, but he unfortunately allowed himself to be derailed by Colson and Buchanan. The President was a gifted stump speaker who responded well to Safire's tutorials on the use of "one-liners" provided by Safire but he never completely heeded Safire's admonition to stop saying "vitally important." Nixon's worst speech (announcing the Cambodian excursion) was one Safire didn't work on, while Nixon's most noteworthy domestic achievement was "The New Federalism" which Safire claims to have midwifed.

An author is entitled to a point of view. Safire, the professed "centrist," worked in tandem with the house "liberals" (Garment, Price, Moynihan, *et al.*) and proudly and justifiably claims significant victories in routing "The True Believers." In his mind, Nixon was never a conservative (I agree with him on this) and Nixon's best instincts were most clearly aligned with the nation's best interest when the President charted a liberal course (I disagree with him here). That Nixon zig-zagged concerned Safire less than it did either the conservatives or liberals on the staff, but then Safire's politics are programmatic, not ideological; and he was wise enough to recognize the strategic result of two steps forward and one step backward. Safire has no use for ideologues or ideology; he is a party man who believes in partisan, not ideological, politics. His chapter on the "Two-Ideology System" is interesting because he quotes at length from Pat Buchanan's analysis of the political futility of Nixonian liberalism, but it reflects absolutely no understanding by Safire of American political history. Safire knows all the political slogans of early Presidential campaigns and knows nothing about the political forces that gave those slogans meaning. "Free Speech, Free Soil, and Free Men" was hardly an advertising gimmick employed by Lincoln's managers in 1860; it was shorthand for basic ideological differences among contenders for political power. If, as Safire suggests, a political party offers a home that shelters the faithful regardless of the political weather, the Whigs would still be in business.

IV.

In perhaps the most important and certainly the most boring chapter in the book, "The Economic Summit," Safire reports the crucial conversations among the President and his advisers that led to the imposition of wage-price controls and the closing of the "gold window." In the course of the discussions at Camp David, the President asked Secretary of the Treasury Shultz on what authority he could impose a limitation on textile imports:

Shultz: "You don't have that authority under the trade acts. There is always the 'trading with the enemy' act—that will enable you to do anything."

Nixon: "No. That smacks wrong from the point of view of international leadership, and *I don't want to corrupt my national security power...*" (emphasis added).

The irony of the Nixon Presidency is that so much of what Nixon didn't want to do, he did and, by so doing, double-crossed himself. Safire has ably captured this irony and thus contributed significantly to an understanding of Nixon and his Presidency. □

Eugene V. Rostow

The Proper Goals of Our Foreign Policy

(This essay is adapted from a speech given by Mr. Rostow before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on April 4, 1975.)

Despite the flurry of bad news during the last few months, America's basic security position is strong—stronger in many ways than has been the case since 1945. We are stronger because the increasing pressures of Soviet policy and the implacable logic of the nuclear weapon have forced Western Europe, China, Japan, and many other countries to recognize that their security interests and our own are indivisible, and will remain indivisible for the indefinite future. The world is becoming smaller and more bipolar.

Yet the United States is in danger, and the danger is increasing with every passing day. How can it be that we are stronger, but feel weaker, and indeed are allowing our advantage to erode?

My explanation for the paradox is that the prevailing American perception of world politics, still reeling under the impact of Korea and Vietnam, has been deeply confused by the Orwellian vocabulary President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger have employed in explaining foreign policy to the American people. President Ford has not yet liberated himself from this feature of his inheritance. Therefore we must still talk of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy, and not yet of a Ford-Kissinger foreign policy. The atmosphere of our domestic politics is still dominated by the strange and misleading language Nixon used when he talked to us about foreign affairs.

As a result, we are passive and timid, where we should be firm and strong. We are cutting our military strength, at a time when our military and political capabilities in world politics should be increasing. We hesitate, when our willingness to act in defense of our interests should be obvious to those who would challenge them. We are retreating when we should be standing fast—when we should be consolidating our alliances, and developing new relations of cooperation with many other countries, on the firm foundation of our shared interests in security. And we are bitterly divided, when we should be a united nation, confronting grave national problems together with all the energy, optimism, and practical common sense which have always characterized American foreign policy at its best.

Our Secretary of State has spoken recently about "a crisis of authority" from which he believes the democracies of the world are suffering. I do not agree. We are indeed in a crisis. It is not a crisis of authority, in my view, but a crisis of understanding, of will, and of civic responsibility.

The only rightful source of American policy is an informed public opinion. No President, however gifted, can carry out an effective foreign policy for long without the support of public opinion. And none of us would have it otherwise. I have complete faith in the fortitude and good judgment of the American people, their instinct for reality, and their willingess to accept any burdens for the sake of the nation. It may be that we are hopelessly caught up in a mood of irrationality and illusion like that which dominated the thirties, but I do not believe it. Certainly no one could draw such a conclusion from the elections of the last decade. I see no reason to doubt our ability to restore a strong and realistic bipartisan consensus about foreign policy. In any event, I am certain that we must try with all our might to do so. If we fail, the future will indeed be ominous, for the tide of events is running strongly against our national interests in world affairs.

The key to the possibility of success in that effort is simple, but not easy. The crystallization of a sound public opinion in any democracy, and especially in our democracy, requires a frank dialogue between the government and the people—sustained, intense, detailed, and thorough. It is nearly impossible for public opinion to understand the patterns beneath the flow of events unless our leaders trust the people, and explain the world with which they have to deal in the direct and unvarnished language of Harry Truman: with the bark on, without hedging or fudging, and above all without partisan bias.

Watergate was not in my judgment Richard Nixon's only offense against the moral code of our constitutional order. Mr. Nixon's way of talking to us about foreign policy also violated the principles of democratic ethics which should govern the relationship between the President of the United States and the American people.

The Failure of Detente

As the news makes more obvious with every passing day, from Portugal and the Middle East to the fall of Southeast Asia, President Nixon did not achieve "detente" with the Soviet Union. To me the only possible meaning for that magic word is a condition of world politics dominated by the habit of full respect for the rules of the United Nation Charter regarding the international use of force. We can hope to reach that goal only by building and maintaining a stable balance of power, on the basis of which we could deter Soviet expansion and ultimately persuade the Soviet Union to respect the rules of the Charter of the United Nations.

Detente with the Soviet Union in this sense is a state of affairs every American President has sought since the time of President Franklin Roosevelt. It should always be a major goal of our foreign policy. But the promise of "detente" has not been realized. Nixon claimed that he had brought the Cold War to an end, and reached a new and stable system of world peace. The hollowness of that claim is now obvious everywhere. We are not living in a condition of "detente" with the Soviet Union. There has been no improvement in our relations with that country. The only changes that have occurred have been in the realm of public relations, not of diplomacy. Soviet policy is exactly what it has always been, except that its pressures are greater and more diverse than ever, and more difficult to deal with. Our problems in Portugal today, for example, are far more complex than those of the Berlin blockade, or the threats to Greece in the late forties. "Negotiation" has not replaced "confrontation" in the policies of the Soviet Union. That nation continues to pursue programs of expansion backed by military budgets which have been increasing at the rate of five percent a year, in real terms, and have no parallel in modern history.

Until President Ford frees us from the incubus of President Nixon's excessive claims about what he accomplished, the agony and the triumph of Watergate will have been in vain. Until President Ford takes that indispensable step, there can be no foundation for the confident, agreed, and bipartisan foreign policy we must restore as the predicate for effective national action. Until that happens, we shall not enter the post-Nixon era.

As a student in London 35 years ago, President Kennedy wrote a book called *Why England Slept*. Its thesis was that if Britain, France, and the United States had roused themselves in time, World War II, and all that flowed from it, could have been prevented. President Kennedy was surely right. But the Western powers, including the United States, are walking in their sleep, as they did during the thirties. Will it take another Pearl Harbor to wake us up? Or can we respond in time, on the basis of reason alone, to prevent another world catastrophe? It is on these questions that the shape of our future depends.

We have had several warnings already quite as clear as Pearl Harbor, notably the war of October 1973 in the Middle East. Thus far, at any rate, we have refused to recognize those events as Pearl Harbors.

The main lines of American foreign policy have been constant since President Truman's time, and they will remain constant, for reasons rooted in the nature of things, unless we should suddenly decide to commit national suicide. Each of our postwar Presidents has had a different style. They have differed in ability, in temperament, in eloquence, and in luck. But the constant themes in their policies have been far more important than the variations. The continuity of our policy reflects the continuity of our national interests, and the necessities of world politics.

How should we define the American national interest in world politics? Some discuss the problem as if foreign policy were a luxury, an optional activity we can turn on and off at will, a form of philanthropy through which we help democratic nations whose policies we approve, and refuse to assist other nations, even against aggression, because we find their social or political systems unattractive, their leaders unsympathetic, or their habits corrupt.

I should make it clear that I reject such formulations of the problem. I am convinced that foreign policy is a serious subject, a necessity and not a matter of choice, and, in these troubled times, the first and most urgent of our national priorities. Foreign policy, like other kinds of policy, is always a matter of adjusting our hopes to our capacities. As Lord Salisbury remarked a long time ago, speaking of the Boer War, "the money will have been well spent if it teaches the British public they can't have the moon just because they want it." In my view, our foreign policy should be dominated by a concern for the national interest, and only for the national interest: our national interest in the safety, prosperity, and honor of the nation, and the democratic character of its institutions.

The essence of the American national interest in world politics is a world order in which we can live and prosper as a democracy at home—a world of wide horizons, and not a nightmare. The goal we must seek, however, is not order alone, but peace. For the century between 1815 and 1914, the United States did not really need a foreign policy. We lived in a system of peace maintained by the Concert of Europe. But for the last sixty years, we have learned once again what we knew so well when the Republic was young—that peace is not a gift of nature, or a blessing conferred on us by our two oceans, but the painful achievement of politics and law. Thus since 1945 the goal of American foreign policy has been not simply to achieve and maintain a deterrent balance of power, but on that indispensable foundation to help restore a system of peace—a system at least as good, and hopefully even better than that of the nineteenth century which came to an end in 1914. That condition—the state of peace—will be realized when world politics is characterized by the expectation that the basic rules of the United Nations Charter with respect to the international use of force will be generally, and reciprocally, obeyed and enforced. The ideal of law has been the organizing principle guiding the evolution of American democracy at home. In this small, contracting, and turbulent world, it is the only possible first principle for the foreign policy of a democracy which aspires to remain a democracy. Our two broad oceans are no longer enough to protect us. Indeed, they never were. Today, they have shrunk to the size of brooks.

Thus it is no accident that under all our postwar Presidents, our foreign policy has had the same four guiding ideas. The first, which we used to call the policy of containment, is that we should seek to prevent the balance of world power from being irreversibly altered by the outward thrust of Soviet policy. The second is the policy of economic reconstruction and development. From the days of Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan, and the Point-Four program, we have tried to build a progressive worldwide economy, embracing the developed and the developing countries alike, and, more recently, the Communist countries as well. The third has been the effort to control nuclear weapons. Starting with the Baruch Plan proposals in 1947, we have never stopped pushing for international agreements that would take nuclear weapons and nuclear science out of world politics. Finally, beginning at least in 1949, we have sought, year after year, to separate China from the Soviet Union.

Each President has had to cope with a different configuration of events. For Nixon, the event of overriding importance was China's decision to turn to the United States for protection against the Soviet Union. That decision was difficult for the Chinese Communists to make, even as a tactical zig or zag. It was a response to the steady Soviet military buildup in Siberia, and the military and political penetration of South and Southeast Asia by the Soviet Union. Soviet forces in Siberia rose from about four divisions in the mid-sixties, to 12 in 1969, and to something like 40 or 45 in 1971, when the Chinese move occurred. The Soviet mobilization on the Siberian border is the most important fact in world politics today. Soviet forces in Siberia are still increasing in size and power. Given the Chinese and Soviet rivalry for leadership of the world's revolutionary impulse, China perceived the Soviet military buildup in Siberia as a mortal threat, and turned to us as the only force on earth that could deter a Soviet attack.

Nixon responded well to the Chinese move, at least in the first instance. He explained both to China and to the Soviet Union that we wished to have equally good relations with each, and that we did not wish to enter into an alliance with one against the other. We opposed hegemonial dominance in Asia as we did in Europe, and for the same basic and eternal reasons of national security. And, Nixon made clear, there must be no war.

China's rapprochement with the United States is the most significant and potentially the most constructive change in the structure of world politics since 1949. If China, with a formidable nuclear arsenal, needed an ongoing security relation with the United States in order to prevent Soviet aggression, the lesson for Western Europe, Japan, and many smaller states was obvious. The magnetic field of world politics is being redefined. A new constellation of shared interests was manifest, based on fear rather than hope, but not less real for that. A more stable equilibrium in world politics seemed distinctly possible. President Nixon, indeed, proclaimed that such an equilibrium had already been achieved.

To this development, the Soviet response was clear-cut. First, the Soviets tried to show the Chinese how futile their move had been, by their full support for the spring offensive of 1972 in Vietnam. When that attack failed, Nixon was enthusiastically received in Moscow, in order to make quite certain that China and the United States were not in fact secretly allied against the Soviet Union. In this setting, the brave promises of detente were made, in May of 1972. The Declaration of Principles and the Communique issued at that time proclaimed that in conducting their relations the two governments would proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence. To fulfill that principle, they promised to work together to achieve peaceful solutions for situations of tension in many parts of the world, to exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and to negotiate and settle all differences by peaceful means. Specifically, both nations undertook to bring peace to Indochina, and the Soviet Union promised to cooperate fully with Ambassador Jarring in negotiating a political settlement in the Middle East, pursuant to the principles and provisions of the Security Council's Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.

We are learning again that peace is not a gift of nature, or a blessing conferred on us by our two oceans, but the painful achievement of politics and law.

The state of tension in the Soviet-Chinese-American triangle and the success of our military efforts and those of the South Vietnamese forces during 1972 led to the Indochina cease-fire agree-

ments of January 1973, which were "guaranteed" by the major powers in the Declaration of Paris in March 1973.

From the American point of view, those agreements were entirely satisfactory—on paper. Despite a few minor ambiguities around the edges, they confirmed the positions for which we and other nations had suffered so bitterly in attempting to carry out our obligations under the SEATO Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations—North Vietnam and South Vietnam were separate states, and the war in Indochina was therefore an international war, not a civil war; and North Vietnam would evacuate Laos and Cambodia, withdraw in effect from South Vietnam, and refrain from any interference, military or political, in the affairs of South Vietnam. On that basis, we should withdraw from South Vietnam, and peace would return to that tortured land. The Soviet Union promised once again to carry out the agreement it had made with us in 1962—the agreement, that is, finally to get the North Vietnamese out of Laos and Cambodia.

The Soviets have never pretended that the 1973 agreements for peace in Indochina were being carried out. And our government, weak and uncertain, did not even protest strongly against the fact that it was being cynically double-crossed by the Soviet Union as well as by the North Vietnamese. In the shadow of Watergate, Nixon and Kissinger were prisoners of their own "detente" rhetoric. They remained silent, and hoped for the best. In the grim Watergate summer of 1973, President Nixon even signed the resolution forbidding all bombing or other military activity in Indochina. Thus ended the last vestige of deterrent uncertainty about America's will to insist on the enforcement of the agreements for peace in Indochina. On a trip to East Asia during that summer, I found that to be the first question on the mind of every government in the region.

The only modern analogy for Soviet behavior in relation to the Indochina agreements of 1973 is the invasion of Czechoslovakia in contempt of the Munich agreements of 1938. That dire event was a clear signal of Hitler's intentions in the thirties. The fate of the Indochina agreements of 1973 has the same significance to the policy problems we face today.

At some point during 1973, once we had withdrawn our troops from Vietnam, perhaps not until the late summer, when Congress had passed and the President had signed the resolution forbidding all American military involvement in Indochina, the Soviets decided to strike against the risk that the Chinese-American rapprochement might genuinely restrain their ongoing programs of expansion. The main theatre they chose for their first attack was the Middle East. It has always been the pattern of Soviet policy, when disappointed or frustrated on one front, to move ahead on another.

Soviet behavior before, during, and since the Middle East war of October 1973, like their failure to carry out their promises with regard to Indochina, made nonsense of the pledges the Soviets had given to Nixon during his Moscow visit of May 1972, and their later reiteration of those pledges. Instead of pressing for a diplomatic settlement in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council Resolution, as they had promised, the Soviets helped to prepare and equip the Arab aggression of October 6, 1973, supported the oil embargo, and urged distant Arab states to enter the fray. And, at the end, they threatened to intervene themselves in order to prevent the total destruction of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces. Again, as they did in Indochina, Nixon and Kissinger concealed what was happening from the American people. In order to preserve the illusion of "detente," they covered up the Soviet role in the October war, both by what they said and by what they did not say. Mr. Kissinger has told us that Soviet behavior before, during, and after the October war was "not unreasonable," and "less obstructive than in 1967," and that our "detente" relations with the Soviet Union contributed to an agreed settlement.

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Vietnam in Perspective

I have no desire to reopen old wounds, or to engage in a great and bloody battle of recriminations over the tragic subject of Vietnam. As Churchill said in 1940, if we turn our minds to fighting over who was right and who was wrong in the period behind us, we shall have no energy left for solving the problems we must face together in the period ahead. There is blame enough, Heaven knows, on all sides.

Blame is not our problem. But understanding is, and so is responsibility. We shall be unable to head off the war that looms unless we come together quickly around a bipartisan foreign policy based on realities rather than dreams, and achieved by open, serious, and responsible debate; and I should therefore like to discuss Vietnam from that perspective.

Speaking to us about Vietnam, for example, President Nixon told us over and over again that the Democrats had put half a million troops into Vietnam, and that his task was to get them out with honor. That statement, repeated a thousand times, was gall and wormwood to every Democrat, as indeed it was intended to be. It contributed immeasurably to the decay of the bipartisan approach to foreign policy, whose consequences we see today. So far as I know, President Nixon never explained to American and world opinion what everybody on earth has suddenly remembered recently—that we entered the Indochina war pursuant to a solemn treaty of the United States, promulgated by President Eisenhower, and approved by a bipartisan vote while Nixon presided over the Senate as Vice President. The decision to use force to help South Vietnam resist the armed attacks of North Vietnam was backed by vote after bipartisan vote of the Congress, and supported by editorials and other expressions of public opinion throughout the nation at the time. But it became taboo to mention the SEATO Treaty as the basis for our policy in Vietnam and that taboo has continued under President Ford. As South Vietnam was collapsing the President and his subordinates still talked of our obligations there as if they stemmed from the executive agreements and secret diplomatic talks of 1973. That is not the case.

In the later phases of the Vietnam war—when public opinion, very sensibly, reached the conclusion that we should win or get out—many Democrats were all too happy to fall in with Nixon's way of talking about the problem. They were glad to forget the Treaty and the other national commitments we had made over the years to help South Vietnam protect itself against aggression.

But treaties of the United States cannot be so easily exorcised in world affairs. We may choose to ignore them, for shabby reasons of domestic politics. That option is not available either to our friends or to our adversaries abroad. For them American treaties and the other commitments are the cement of the world political system—the only cement there is.

What conclusions, then, should we draw from the fall of Indochina?

First, in General Stillwell's immortal phrase, our policy has taken a terrrible licking. Southeast Asia is an important region of the world—not so vital, strategically, as Europe and the Middle East—but important in itself—important to naval strategy; important economically and politically; and important above all to the dynamics of the Soviet-Chinese-American triangle whose stability is the most powerful foundation for a possible structure of peace. Despite an important tactical defeat, we cannot abandon the region. The interests of a great power must be protected despite setbacks.

Second, we must move rapidly and with conviction on the diplomatic front to repair the damage to world politics implicit in the demonstration that an American treaty can be made worthless. There is a new doubt, a new uncertainty,

everywhere—an uncertainty which will not be overcome by brave words alone. As Sir Robert Thompson suggested in his bitter and passionate article in the *New York Times*, the events in Indochina will convince many people that the Soviet Union is a more reliable ally than the United States.

We can be certain, after Vietnam, that the Soviets will soon move again—in the Middle East or the Persian Gulf, in Portugal, or in some area we are not particularly worried about at the moment: South Korea, for example, whose independence is essential to the security of Japan, or China itself, or Western Europe.

The best diplomatic signal we could give, in the face of these events, would be a sharp increase in our defense budget, particularly for the Navy, for our ready forces, and for research and development.

On that basis, we could hope to move with conviction to restore the confident solidarity of our alliance relations, and sobriety, shall we say, in our relations with the Soviet Union.

"Speak for America"

Our foreign policy agenda is formidable in every field, from monetary and energy problems to those of nuclear weapons, alliance relations, and food. In my opinion, effective programs of action on all these subjects are within our reach, if, but only if, we soon come to a common and agreed answer to these fundamental questions: What is our foreign policy for? And what means should we use to carry it out?

I think I can claim to be the only bureaucrat who ever went up and down the country making official speeches to the effect that our most important foreign policy problem was to resolve the Jungian tension between our collective unconscious and the facts of life. Our collective unconscious preserves a beautiful vision in our minds—the vision of nineteenth-century America, isolated and aloof, without entangling alliances, and entirely neutral in the various conflicts of world power politics. We must finally liberate ourselves from this dream. The nineteenth century is over. The nations which maintained the general peace of the nineteenth century no longer have the power to do so. Unless we take our share of responsibility for the process of peace, there will be no peace. World politics will degenerate into conflict after conflict until we and other nations react, as we did four times in this century, when we felt threatened by hostile forces that would become overpowering unless we struck out against them. The basic cause of war, as Thucydides pointed out many centuries ago, is fear. What made the Peloponnesian War inevitable, Thucydides wrote, "was the growth of Athenian power, and the fear which this caused in Sparta."

We are living in the midst of a comparable process today. We are the only people on earth who can arrest that process in time to prevent war, by proceeding calmly, patiently, and steadily in the pattern of firmness and conciliation which has characterized our foreign policy since President Truman's time. To accomplish this goal will require a great national and international effort—in the first instance, an effort of thought, a debate, and then a series of votes on defense, and aid, and other hard subjects.

The United States should be the master, not the victim, of its fate. The will of our people cannot be mobilized unless the President, every official of the Executive Branch, every member of Congress, and every citizen addresses these issues with words and deeds adequate to their gravity. The dangers before us demand a sharp and dramatic turn in the direction of our policy. That turn will not come in time to prevent war unless we face the issues directly and soberly, without partisanship, in the spirit of civic responsibility which is the genius of our democratic society.

Some of you will recall Leopold Amery's great outburst in the House of Commons in 1939, to a speaker who was dithering about Britain's response to the invasion of Poland. "Speak for England," he shouted. Amery's words helped to precipitate a new state of resolve in Britain, and throughout the free world. We are at a point where Amery's cry should be heeded again. For every one of us who speaks, or writes, or votes on issues of American foreign policy today, the only rule should be "Speak for America." □

Thomas Molnar

Religion and the Urbanized Continuum

There is no reason why religion should be incompatible with life in cities. Jerusalem was the center of Judaism, and Christianity conquered the urban centers long before it managed to permeate the countryside, as the term "pagan" (*paganus*, peasant) clearly indicates. Religion, far from being the fare of the intellectually backward or of the isolated mystic, is a mental and spiritual stimulant, as is shown by the presence of many brilliant theologians and churchmen in the Western tradition and by the persistent and ubiquitous discourse on God in the works of philosophers, novelists, poets, and painters. Religion remains an inseparable component of culture, debate, and the mind's search for ultimate things.

It is undeniable, on the other hand, that *our* urban life corrodes religion and causes it to deviate toward distorted forms: esoteric sects, pseudomystic gatherings, curiosity for and commercialization of the occult, the rush for Oriental techniques, the cult of gurus, the popularity of neo-gnostics like Heidegger and Hesse. We are witnessing a rapid secularization of the clergy, even of the heretofore strict orders, and the transformation of religious institutions (seminaries, schools, universities) into hotbeds of revolution and immorality. This degeneracy is especially alarming because almost all our institutional and private life is patterned after an implicitly recognized religious valuation. The *trahison des prêtres* is an even more serious socio-intellectual act than that of the *clercs*.

The questions that this brief analysis sets out to answer are: What, in our urbanized milieu, are the causes of religious erosion? Can we expect a reversal of the trend? And, finally, is it proper to speak of an "urban milieu," or should we speak rather of an undifferentiated and vague "society," even of a "public," an open society closed on itself, self-sufficient, autarchic?

Christianity, the faith which has shaped the worldview of the majority of Americans, has from its beginning displayed a wise mixture of other-worldly and this-worldly, or, as we might put it, of vertical and horizontal elements. As early as the second century, while Christians were subjected to periodic persecution, the anonymous author of the "Letter to Diognetes" pointed out that Christians behave as better citizens than their pagan fellows: they are disciplined soldiers, conscientious workers, pious housewives, and well-liked teachers. Christians are good citizens, the author added, because they are *in* society but not *of* it; their faith and virtue make for civic loyalty and constructive participation. It would be easy to argue that in our society (twentieth-century, industrial, mass, democratic, pluralistic) erosion of such civic virtue has set in at both ends: religious faith has slackened under the weight of hedonism and atomization (the "lethargic yet tumultuous society" anticipated by Tocqueville); and life in the State and

public institutions has become so distant, so impersonal, that participation can no longer assume concrete and satisfying forms. Such an argument, however, would be blind to the similar state of Roman society when the Letter to Diognetes was written. The hedonistic temptations were as great then as now, and loyalty to the State was hardly stronger: the Romans tried to avoid military service (hence the hiring of mercenaries, entire tribes of them) and the Christians ostensibly refused loyalty to Divus Caesar.

We must therefore go deeper to grasp the nature of religious erosion. Although religion in its *sui generis* forms is not present in the nooks of everyday existence, it acts as an overall guarantor of moral and social equilibrium. This is why cynics and ideologues call it a "conservative" force—which it is. Religion seems to say: "The world is an order of things and relationships, not the best, to be sure, but it allows these things and relationships to fall into shape, to become accepted, to change only when necessary. This order requires an upward pull, a belief, which society cannot supply by itself. Without this belief in things higher, which are not simply 'values' but objects of worship and reverence, society risks becoming the Great Beast of Plato, an idolatrous tribe blocking its own spiritual safety valves." Thus in a society where religion is lively and strong, even the agnostic and the indifferent need (often unconsciously) the "vertical" to justify and stimulate the "horizontal." Remove the vertical, and everyday life will exert all its pull on man, filling his existence with the lead of routine, without providing the lift he needs in order to be a good citizen by being more than a citizen.

It was decades ago that our society reached a dangerous threshold of secularization, but at first this was apparent merely in the life of public institutions. In other Western societies the separation of State and Church was achieved officially, but the battle goes on, partly because the memory of the Church's historical participation in the State remains. In America, the separation of State and Church and the resulting secular society have been with us since independence; but tolerance as well as the vastness of the continent has permitted private religiosity to coexist with public agnosticism. It seems, however, that we have now exhausted the possibilities of this equilibrium between the public and the private: a more rural America, not yet joined in an urbanized continuum, could afford to be religious while it was also vigilant that the public sphere remained secular; but when all live in a semipublic milieu, connected by a myriad of administrative and electronic umbilical cords to the common denominator, the individual citizen begins accepting the anonymous public decree. It is hard to say, of course, who promotes the secularization of America: the public leaders or the private person. For example, when all national holidays were re-dated Mondays, was it done (by Congress) under pressure from workers to have more and longer weekends—or was it done by a desacralized political body following the logic of a merciless demythization? In any case, the secularization is popularly accepted. (Let us note in passing that the Congressional decision coincided with the Roman Church's calendar reform, the removal of saints without "credentials"—an eminently rationalistic step.)

A society possesses a great deal of resilience and its so-called moral fiber can outlast the decadence of its institutions; yet it cannot survive for long—notwithstanding Hume, Max Weber, and others who believed that skeptical or socialist gentlemen could live comfortably in demythologized societies on the

accumulated moral capital of scriptural *verities*, if only society would translate the discredited verities into decent *values*. "Value," however, is always an inflated currency, unable to buy what the gold coin of truth can buy on the moral market. This can be ascertained today when State, schools, churches, and courts beg the citizen to commit his "values" in defense of order, law, decency, and honesty in public life—failing to realize that when such responsibilities are left to the individual alone, even if he is a gentleman, the burden is entirely unbearable. The individual *qua* citizen is a member of many intersecting networks, and he is able to function only when the networks are solid. It is useless to ask *him* to mend their growing deficiencies, that is, e.g., to make sure that schools teach substantive material, courts punish criminals, the media inform impartially, churches preach morality and salvation.

Among these networks the one conveying the religious message is by far the most important in the long run, precisely because it supports all the others and, as a worldview of transcendence, explains them. This role is performed by the Church on condition that the Church itself remains, as the writer to Diognetes insisted, *in* but not *of* mundane society. What we see, however, is churches which yield to the weight of society and become literally superfluous, even damaging. "Secularization" in its penultimate phase is not a rampaging immorality, but rather the citizen's strong conviction that society has its own absolute weight, it is self-propelled, it can last forever. But let us remember that in the eyes of Hebrews and Christians this view of society is totally false, because the world is not self-sufficient: it is precarious, porous, transparent. God is visible behind it. In this regard the spreading apocalyptic mood among the religious "remnant" is a desperate attempt of a few to see the world and society as being under God's providence—if only as the last act of punishment. The majority, however, does not perceive things this way; on the contrary, it believes that all problems left "to God" in the past can now be solved by powerful men through the magic wand of expertise and science.

On the citizen's level, it seems obvious that the social, cultural, economic mechanisms—if suitably lubricated with individual initiative—provide existence with an immanent ultimate meaning. He sees every day a legion of technicians—of body and mind—rushing to remedy, smoothen, satisfy, and invent the most eccentric need, the slightest anticipated blocage, the least incipient desire. The citizen thus comes to conceive society as an enormous self-sufficient and self-sustaining entity, filling the universe, *causa sua*. He begins to worship it because he admires it and depends on it. We have here a strange new and exactly inverted version of primitive societies where every social act is ritualized, i.e. made secure by reference to a higher cosmic order. In our society, where social acts are drained of all transcendence, the ritual is a mere tribute to society itself; it does not reenact the cosmogonic myth, only the rules of conformism.

* * *

It is said that ours is a complex, pluralistic society about which generalizations should not be made. In words intended, I suspect, for tourists, it is also said that in the length and width of this vast country myriad ways of life may be found, every state, region, municipality, minority differing from all the others. This is one more verbal tribute paid to the "horizontal." In reality, the social mechanisms operating in this land seek to extend the horizontal, to make it exclusive, to turn it into the only system of reference. Mircea Eliade remarks that primitive man conceives his society (tribe) as a small replica of the cosmos; without the cosmos there would be no society, and without the replica, the small cosmos, man could not deal with the forces of nature and the surrounding universe of spirits. Society (the replica) renders the universe intelligible and propitiates the forces which otherwise would crush its members. Thus universe and society, both inhabited by man, are inseparable, they explain each other. Let us use this concept in order to clarify the ultimate significance of our society: we find it no longer a replica of anything, it is simply (complicatedly) itself, satisfied with its being, immanent, full, without needs or regards cast outside itself. Even its so-called self-doubts merely reinforce its belief that it can engender a new certainty. History has never yet witnessed such an autarchy. And such a hubris.

It is rightly questionable whether religion is possible in such a society, other than in its reformist-therapeutic variety: it is supposed to improve race relations, housing problems, wage-adjustments; it is an auxiliary to other horizontally concerned social mechanisms and agencies. In regard to churches in America today, the Anglican bishop John Robinson's little book, *Honest to God*, published a dozen years ago, comes to mind. Robinson argued the irrelevance of transcendence, and recommended a reorientation of churches to social concerns: conditions in prisons, the problem of divorce, sewage systems in poor neighborhoods, etc. That is more or less where we are: society has become a church and the Church is absorbed by society. This is the contemporary form of caesaropapism, Caesar's implicit rule over the spiritual power. The latter has curbed its mission to the exclusive service of the former, not because it is compelled to do so as in the good old days of conflict between spiritual and temporal, but because the Church now actually believes in society as the ultimate verity.

Is this degeneracy due to the urban character of society, to its cosmopolitan features? Not so; unless they are tribal, thus voluntarily limited in their appeal, religions are capable of stirring up large masses of people and of carrying their message to all categories. Christianity in Rome first conquered the slaves, the households of high officials, and many intellectuals. Soon the centurions and the senators followed. But, as said before, we no longer have balanced societies, only a kind of public continuum. It is not the city as such but the exclusively horizontal dimension of our civilization that has conquered us.

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While religion has become implausible in our urbanized, leveled landscape, it has not become impossible: the message is not, never will be, the medium; the medium can always be compelled to carry the message. Slowly America ceases to be the earthly paradise, a substitute for heaven, and, like Rome, the goal of all efforts. Like Rome, which became with the empire religiously pluralistic, our pluralistic society too faces great difficulties in its religious restoration. Religion is a corporate, not a private, enterprise, not even a group-affair. Its vocation is to fill society by occupying its spiritual center and spreading to the peripheries. In any case, religion is either dynamic and proselytizing or it is dead. A single established church may become petrified; but pluralism too has its dangers: it blocks religious dynamism, it fragments the spiritual aspiration, it erodes what is most universal in the religious message. At present, we are in the phase of disguised attacks and of mockery, as musicals like *Candide* and films like *The Exorcist* show. Increasingly also, people begin celebrating their own cults, imported or homemade. Christians are in a state of confusion, Judaic loyalties are addressed less to Yahweh than to Israel, the minorities celebrate their search for political identity, and the intelligentsia worships the Absolute Absurd. Perhaps the time is near when all of us, together, start singing the *De Profundis*.... □

Dale Vree

Prophecy, Providence, and Politics

Undoubtedly many of you reading this essay have had your cherished political beliefs condemned as violations of the very *will of God* by some zealous priest, minister, or college chaplain. This can be a shocking and bewildering experience for those who count themselves as reasonably good Christians.

It is one thing for a priest to say, "In my own humble opinion, such and such is an unwise and/or immoral policy." But it is quite another thing when he mounts his pulpit and announces that he is a successor to the Old Testament *prophets* and possesses privileged insight into God's *providential* will for the political arrangements of mankind. How often have we—that is, those of us who still listen—heard that the Chinese (or some other Third World) revolution was ordained by God as a punishment for the wicked ways of the white man? How often have we heard that Martin Luther King was sent by God to save his people? How often have we heard that the Holy Spirit is our liberator and that therefore the Bill of Rights as interpreted by the American Civil Liberties Union constitutes a new gift of the Spirit?

I am not interested in discussing the merits of the Chinese revolution, Martin Luther King, or the ACLU. Frankly, I do not know what God and/or the Holy Spirit think of these things, and I have no idea whether your attitudes on these issues are godly or ungodly. But I am convinced that our men of the cloth who style themselves modern prophets have no greater insight into the politics of God than I do, or you do. Furthermore, given the historical standards of orthodox Christianity, our modern prophets are probably not prophets at all, but rather *false prophets* who dishonor the very cause of God they presume to serve.

True and False Prophecy

The distinction between prophecy and false prophecy presupposes a conception of religious authority. The need for such an authority was expressed in the New Testament itself: "But do not trust any and every spirit; test the spirits, to see whether they are from God, for among those who have gone out into the world there are many prophets falsely inspired" (1 John 4:1, New English Bible). The Church tackled this problem of authority early. It decided that a false prophet was one whose illuminations either contradicted or were not warranted by the Scriptures as interpreted by the Tradition of the Apostolic Church, and who proceeded to regard his illuminations as normative for the whole Church. This error, which was known as Montanism in the early Church, was officially condemned by the Church when Montanus was excommunicated in 177 A.D. Protestants of course reject Tradition and the Apostolic Succession as practiced by the early Church; however, they came to an analogous *principle*, namely, that whatever contradicts or is not warranted by the Scriptures as interpreted by the Lutheran and/or Calvinist traditions (which appropriated much of the basis of the Apostolic Tradition) is falsely inspired. The condemnation of Montanism is endorsed by orthodox Protestantism as well as by the Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Anglican branches of Christendom which adhere to the Apostolic Succession and the Catholic Tradition.

For the orthodox Christian, then, the authentic source of revelation is the Bible as understood by the tradition of his church or denomination. Any alleged prophecies, miracles, or actions of the Holy Spirit which occur in contemporary times must be *tested* for authenticity in terms of their conformity with authentic revelation. It is not my purpose here to determine what "orthodox Christianity" is in its every detail, but only to indicate one example of what orthodox Christianity *cannot be*.

There are growing numbers of "pentecostal" Christians who make prophetic utterances on behalf of God. Usually these utterances are very personal and conventionally orthodox, hence of no immediate concern to the orthodox churches. What should be of concern to these churches, however, are those politicized Christians who mimic the prophetic mode, announce *new* and unprecedented revelations about the will of God, and try

to press the churches into conformity with their private political illuminations. These politicos who pose as prophets are actually heretics—just as the Montanists were heretics—because they prophesy, not on behalf of God, but on behalf of an alien god, in this case, the *Zeitgeist* (or Spirit of the Age).

The *Zeitgeist* is a Hegelian notion. The *Zeitgeist* is an ontological imperative which possesses its own power and authority, and guides the direction of history. It is a reification; it is more than a collection of ideas, it is *the Idea*. It is more than the sum of its parts. It is more *Real* than real. Assuming that there is such a phenomenon as the Spirit of the Age, my thesis is that the Spirit of this *Modern* Age is anti-Christian, and that our modern prophets worship it by treating it as a new source of revelation, mistaking it for the Holy Spirit or Providence, and investing it with eschatological significance. In its broadest sense our *Zeitgeist* is the messianic Idea of Progress, the yearning for an earthly New Jerusalem which—beginning with the Enlightenment, as Louis I. Bredvold has indicated—has become "deeply engrained... in the modern mind."[1]

The Monumental Hubris

It is instructive to contrast the secular messianism of the modern spirit with the traditional Christian philosophy of history. According to Eric Voegelin, the Christian view distinguishes between "a profane sphere of history in which empires rise and fall and a sacred history which culminates in the appearance of Christ and the establishment of the church.... Only transcendental history, including the earthly pilgrimage of the church, has direction toward its eschatological fulfillment. Profane history, on the other hand, has no such direction; it is a waiting for the end...."[2] Since modern culture could no longer swallow the notion of a transcendental history, it imputed the values, symbols, and prophecies of transcendental history to profane history. Providence was the architect of transcendental history and what the Enlightenment did was to *transform Providence into historical Progress*, the architect of which is man—all of which is a radical break from traditional Christianity. With the progressive conquests of science and human reason, it seemed possible to translate heavenly promises into earthly realities. Hence, the urge to realize the Kingdom of God on earth came to be the hallmark of the modern sensibility.

Modernity endowed profane history with a purpose, a direction, and a destination. Transcendence was collapsed and converted from a heavenly dimension (the "Above") into a dimension of this world, the dimension of the future (the "Ahead"). The hope for perfection after death was transformed by modernity into the assertion of man's divinity in an earthly future. As Robert C. Tucker wrote: "The movement of thought from Kant to Hegel revolved in a fundamental sense around the idea of man's self-realization as a godlike being or, alternately, as God. A radical departure from Western tradition was implicit in the tendency. The centuries-old ruling conception of an unbridgeable chasm of kind between the human and the divine gave way to the conception of a surmountable difference of degree. It is hardly surprising that out of such a revolution of religion there issued, among other things, a religion of revolution."[3] This desire to reclaim the attributes of divinity for mankind—a desire best articulated by Ludwig Feuerbach—and to impute the characteristics of transcendental history to profane history is a monumental act of *hubris* from the viewpoint of traditional Christianity. It is the epitome of the sins of pride and idolatry, namely, the rejection of human finitude, and the divinization or worship of self. Once a supernatural God is denied and transcendence is made into a human dimension, the religious relationship to God is turned inside out and reappears as a "quasi-religious relationship to *the spirit of a secular age*."[4]

The modern belief in Progress, whatever its original rationalistic underpinnings, does indeed manifest religious qualities. As a faith it seems remarkably impervious to repeated evidence of crisis and disaster. Because Progress is really the religion of modernity "it could not die with the guns of August [1914], nor with the Depression of the 30s, nor even with Auschwitz."[5] The Spirit of the Age is so potent and durable that, despite its anti-Christian thrust, it even works its way into the Household of Faith.

One of our leading modern prophets is Harvey Cox, a professor at the Harvard Divinity School, a McGovern booster, and the celebrant of *The Secular City* and *The Feast of Fools*. Cox, who denies a supernatural God, contends that God reveals himself, not primarily in the Bible or church, but in the progressive historical and political events of the secular world. Cox identifies the Spirit of the world with God: "Only when we have learned the world's language can we speak of God. The world, its character, its hopes, its meaning, its destiny, becomes the content as well as the context of our speaking."[6] In Cox's view, however the world understands itself, that is God. The world's secular, optimistic, and messianic self-understanding, its Spirit, *is* God. In Hegelian fashion, history is the autobiography of the *Zeitgeist* as it moves toward self-realization in the march of humanity toward the Kingdom of God on earth.

Marxist-Christian Monologue

Marxism is the most vigorous and durable expression of modernity and its secular messianism—as Roger Garaudy, the French neo-Marxist has said, "Marxism is not only a philosophy of our time. It is our time's sense."[7]—and our modern prophets have been anxious to make peace with it. They have taken the dimension of earthly futurity as their theological point of departure and their point of contact with Marxism. For example, Cox says that in the past there were "movements of intense fascination with the future, such as... in the millenarian and chiliastic groups.... Today, however, orientation to the future is not a minority preoccupation but the mood of a whole culture."[8] Juergen Moltmann, the German "theologian of hope," says that one of the common bases for dialogue with Marxism is the "eschatological interpretation of *modern times* as the dawning of the 'new age' and the 'new world.' "[9] Both Cox and Moltmann are socialists who would agree with Garaudy when he says that the churches must accept socialism, and when he asks Christians to "give a Christian answer to the problems of our times and to give it *in the spirit of our times*."[10] It is noteworthy that Garaudy has already described Marxism as the sense of our times; hence, a "Christian" answer to the problems of our times reduces itself to something not too different from a Marxist answer. That which is so widely hailed as a "dialogue" between Marxists (like Garaudy) and Christians (like Cox and Moltmann) subtly becomes a monologue whereby Marxism assimilates Christianity into the dominant chorus of the times. However, Christianity's historical understanding of itself forbids a capitulation to the times. In the words of Karl Barth (generally regarded as the greatest Protestant theologian of the twentieth century): "the Church must not allow itself to be swept away by the movements of the age...."[11]

One of Cox's persistent claims, and one of the major themes of our modern prophets, is that God is a "politician-God" who works through the progressive political events of the day: "Theology today must be that reflection-in-action by which the church finds out what this politician-God is up to and moves in to work along with him. In the [present] epoch of the secular city, politics replaces metaphysics as the language of theology."[12] Cox has changed his mind about various matters during his career, but he has never had difficulty in spotting the hand of God. He has said that evidence of the breaking in of God's Kingdom could be found in the Freedom Schools set up in the heyday of the civil rights movement and in Saul Alinsky's Woodlawn experiment,[13] as well as in the integration of professional baseball.[14] Most recently,

The spirit of our age is anti-Christian and modern prophets worship it by treating it as a new source of revelation, mistaking it for the Holy Spirit or Providence.

he has pointed to the Kingdom in the liberation of "nature from its thralldom to man's greed," in the children's liberation movement, in Margaret Mead's idea of cluster families and modified monogamy, and in the transcendence of the nation-state system.[15]

Sometimes it is not the action of God, but the action of the Holy Spirit, which is perceived, as when the former Catholic priest Philip Berrigan said in 1968: "You see the Spirit is not chained! My friend George McGovern has declared himself for the Presidency. I only hope that this move will help McCarthy take the scene."[16] McCarthy did not take the scene; however, Berrigan continued in the prophetic mode: "Yes, man is really coming to a full self-consciousness.... the Holy Spirit is working through today's communication media and technology, making people aware of their wretched plight, and revolting against it."[17] Garry Wills elegantly diagnosed this mentality when he said that "some proponents of modernity... seem convinced that the Spirit of the Age and the Holy Spirit have somehow intermingled flames...."[18]

A Second Source of Revelation

In general, our modern prophets tend to see the hand of God in the rise of Communism (frequently deemed a "judgment of God" upon the sins of the capitalist West), the violent revolutions of oppressed Third World peoples, the peace movement, the student movement, the women's movement, and the black movement.[19] In fact, wherever the *Zeitgeist* is working itself out, there is God. Wherever men, responding to the imperatives of the age, are involved in allegedly noble and uplifting human pursuits, God is with them almost by definition. The guiding principle of this way of thinking was expressed half a century ago by the leading light in the American Social Gospel movement, Walter Rauschenbusch, when he said: "The gospel, to have full power over an age, must be the highest expression of the moral and religious truths held by that age." He urged the churches to support "the high patriotic and social ambitions" of the age.[20]

Curiously, it was this kind of logic which allowed Lord Rosebery to sing the praises of the British Empire in such effusive terms as these: "How marvelous it all is! Built not by saints and angels, but the work of men's hands; cemented with men's honest blood and with a world of tears, welded by the best brains of the centuries past; not without the taint and reproach incidental to all human work, but constructed on the whole with pure and splendid purpose. *Human and yet not wholly human*, for the most heedless and the most cynical must see *the finger of the Divine*."[21]

It was also this kind of logic which led the *Deutsche Christen*, the pro-Hitler "German Christians," to support the ambitions of National Socialism, to the point of regarding Hitler's assumption of power as an act of divine redemption and a new source of divine revelation.[22] Today it is an uncontested truth that the German-Christian phenomenon was treacherous and lamentable. Why? Because it aided Hitler, yes, but also because it perverted and polluted the Gospel by injecting an alien element, namely, "Germanism." In the words of Barth: "beside the Holy Scriptures as the unique source of revelation, the German-Christians affirm the German nationhood, its history and its contemporary political situation as *a second source of revelation*, and thereby betray themselves to be believers in 'another God.' "[23]

Barth was the leader of the neo-orthodox movement in Continental Protestant theology. He stood for the sovereignty of a transcendent God and the authority of the Scriptures. He did battle with the religious liberals who sought to immanentize God, cast doubt on the reliability of the Scriptures, and enlist religion in the service of what were thought to be man's noble endeavors. According to H. Richard Niebuhr, religious liberals sought to prove religion's usefulness to man "in promoting the dominant purposes of the age or group in which they lived, the purposes of nationalism where nationalism was in power, of capitalism where capitalism reigned, of radicalism where radicalism took the initiative."[24] And, it must be added, National Socialism where National Socialism prevailed. It should be remembered that Nazism appeared for a long time to many Germans (and non-Germans) as a noble cause.

Liberal religion, almost by definition, is a defensive attempt to seek an accommodation with the outlook of the secular world. Such a secular-minded and man-centered theology refuses to set itself up against the ascendant presuppositions of the day. In the case before us, it led to the Nazifying of the German churches. Franklin H. Littell described the problem well: "The Liberal Theology had done much to disintegrate the theological integrity of the Protestant Churches. Activity in the field of social reform was taking the place of witness to the Gospel of Redemption. And there were those who were willing to fill the void created by their own disbelief by political enthusiasms—enthusiasm for Socialism, or, in the situation of 1933, for National Socialism. It was from these people that the so-called 'German Christians' emerged."[25] What Barth had done was to direct the fire against "the dominant liberalism, which saw the divine in immanent continuity with the 'best' and the 'highest' in man's spirit and culture, so that talking about God did indeed become, as Barth was later to comment so caustically, 'talking about man in a loud voice.' "[26]

Joseph Hromádka was one of the leaders, along with Barth, of the resistance to the German-Christians. When the Communists took over his native Czechoslovakia in 1948, Hromádka offered them his support. He sought to have Christians develop a positive attitude toward Communism, even during the Stalinist era. Although he did not immanentize God and he clearly distinguished the Kingdom of God from any man-made utopia, in seeking harmonious dialogue with Marxism, he too fell into the Montanist second-source-of-revelation heresy.

According to one of Hromádka's admirers, Charles C. West, Hromádka held that natural reason gave man knowledge of God's works and activities. Hromádka believed it was possible to discern God's hand in secular political events. Just as the German-Christians believed that God had revealed his will through the Nazi revolution, so Hromádka believed that God had spoken through the Communist revolution in Czechoslovakia.[27] According to Matthew Spinka, he was convinced that "communism is the divinely-ordained 'wave of the future,' " which "is destined, inevitably and irresistibly, to conquer the world."[28] According to West, he treated the tenets of Communist ideology as "God-given 'scientific' axioms."[29] He thought Communism was succeeding where Christianity had failed; indeed, he felt that Communists were in a

Marxism is the most vigorous and durable expression of modernity and its secular messianism, and our modern prophets have been anxious to make peace with it.

sense more "Christian" than Christians themselves.

With all these presuppositions, it is not surprising that Hromádka prostrated himself in penitential fashion before the Communist idol. He had no choice but to allow himself to be used. Thus, while countless Christians languished in Czechoslovak jails, he was granted the rare privilege of traveling to the West to defend the policies of the Communist powers in front of Western churchmen. He was also allowed to host Western church people in Prague with an eye to enlisting them in the support of Communist causes. After the Soviet invasion of his country in 1968 (which he bitterly opposed) he came to admit his prostration: "We have often come to meetings and conferences [that is, international gatherings of Christians] with certain views and tasks which were given to us from outside [namely, the Party], directly or indirectly. We have assumed that we were obliged to push through these views and tasks under all circumstances; we have not had the courage to listen to each other [fellow Christians] and to make decisions freely through real dialogue."[30]

Providence as Manifest

It is even possible to go one step further by imbuing secular events with such sacred significance that they become organically related to the drama of salvation itself. In this way the hand of God is not only perceived in profane history, but salvation itself is subordinated to certain events in profane history. Although the logic of Hromádka's position propelled him in this direction, he actually stopped short of it. Said West: "it is just one step, which Hromádka hints at but does not take, to the endowment of 'socialist reconstruction' in a Communist society, already possessed of a historical necessity of its own, with a positive relation to the Christian hope." Albert Berecsky, the Reformed bishop of Hungary, had fewer reservations about elevating socialism into a medium of salvation: "he asserts a 'positive correlation between the history of salvation and world history.' "[31]

Barth, who strongly defended the progressive political views of Berecsky (and Hromádka), rose to express his deep suspicion of Berecsky's theological position, which he associated with false prophecy and a second revelation. Barth warned: "you are on the way to making your affirmation of communism a part of the Christian message, an article of faith which... threatens to overshadow all other articles of faith, and on the basis of which you would now interpret the whole creed and the whole Bible. In other words, you are falling into that ideological-Christian way of thinking which once, under different auspices, was adopted by the 'German Christians.' "[32]

The German-Christians saw the "finger of the Divine" in the Nazi revolution, Lord Rosebery saw it in the British Empire, Hromádka and Berecsky saw it in the rise of Communism, and Cox, carrying on this tradition, sees it in the integration of professional baseball *et al.* Since the causes endorsed are so various and contradictory it is unlikely, on the face of it, that all of them would represent God's will. Then what *objective Christian* criterion is there by which to judge when and where God is, and is not, acting in profane history? Given the standards of orthodoxy, it would seem that there is no standard whatsoever by which judgments of this nature can be rendered. One is forced to conclude that judgments of this kind, whether of the "Right" or the "Left," are probably products of exacerbated political passions and/or naive prejudices.

German-Christians saw the finger of the divine in the rise of Nazism, Lord Rosebery saw it in the British Empire, and Harvey Cox sees it in the integration of professional baseball.

From the viewpoint of orthodoxy, the problem here is that there is a mistaken view whereby Providence is regarded as *manifest* rather than *mysterious*. When Providence is equated with one's own understanding of man's noblest designs and achievements, then the temptation is overwhelming to see God supporting one's own favorite political projects. Notions of a *manifest* Providence are probably always self-serving. The result is an idolatrous second source of revelation which rivals or supersedes the teachings of the Bible and the church. Adherents of a manifest Providence are oblivious to the mysterious ways of God, as expressed in the words of the prophet: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, and your ways are not my ways. This is the very word of the Lord" (Isa. 55:8 NEB), and in the words of St. Paul: "O depth of wealth, wisdom, and knowledge in God! How unsearchable his judgements, how untraceable his ways! Who knows the mind of the Lord? Who has been his counsellor?" (Rom. 11:33-34 NEB). Indeed, Karl Loewith has observed that "the Hebrew-Christian tradition... obstructs the attempt to 'work out' the working of God."[33]

Cheap Prophecy

Notions of a manifest Providence are closely tied in with prophecy. It is characteristically through the prophet that God reveals his will. That is, it is the prophet who enjoys the special gift of discerning God's ways and pronouncing his judgment. Modeling themselves on the Old Testament prophets, our modern prophets often announce God's purposes in history and bring his judgment upon the excesses of capitalism, the oppressors of Third World peoples, warmongers, university bureaucrats, male chauvinists, polluters, and white racists. The mark of a true prophet, Paul Ramsey said sarcastically, is to prophesy against the government and/or the Right Wing![34]

This kind of prophecy comes fast and furious. It has sometimes been called "cheap" prophecy because it is often made so easily and with so few risks. This urge for instant prophecy is frequently indulged in when councils of churches meet and denominations hold their conventions. Delegates are implored to involve themselves in the issues of the day in a truly "prophetic" manner. Resolutions are dutifully passed and submitted to the press. Perhaps the reason why this kind of prophetic activity comes so effortlessly is that the point of reference is not some inscrutable God of history, but the Spirit of the Age—the content of which is open to anyone who cares to inquire.

Ironically, this desire to emulate the Old Testament prophets usually misses the authentic spirit of prophecy: "A prophet is a man through whom God speaks. This is one of the most awesome fates that could befall a human being, and it is usually accompanied by great suffering. Not surprisingly, most of the prophets appearing in the Bible strenuously resisted this vocation. They finally accepted it because they could no longer resist God." These are the words of Peter L. Berger, disclaiming the honorific title of "angry young prophet" which had been affixed to him and his work. For him to regard his own activity as prophetic, he said, would be "blasphemous."[35] One reason why the orthodox Christian is so anxious to disavow, rather than assume, the prophetic mantle, is that he knows that true prophecy is an extraordinary event and Providence is essentially mysterious.

The fact that modern prophecy is such a widespread activity is circumstantial evidence that it is not lodged on behalf of God. To be sure, modern prophets attack unjust social institutions and habits, and champion the poor. But this is only a derivative aspect of the authentic prophetic function. To champion the poor does not make one *ipso facto* a prophet. For example: "When Jeremiah went around Jerusalem telling the people to surrender to the Babylonians, he wasn't saying something that comforted the poor, or the rich either. In fact, he wasn't even comforting himself."[36] Furthermore, simply to be for "the good" does not make one *ipso facto* a prophet either. Said Reinhold Niebuhr: "The prophet is an iconoclast who throws all symbols of

human *goodness* out of the Temple."[37]

In short, the mark of a true prophet is to speak the authoritative and binding word of God, even to the point of pain and suffering. This is an imposing, perhaps dreadful, event. According to the Old Testament scholar Gerhard von Rad: "there is universal agreement, that visions and auditions came to the prophets from outside themselves, and that they came suddenly and completely without premeditation.... There is no doubt that, at the moment when the prophets received a revelation, they believed that they heard themselves addressed in words.... [V]ery frequently at least, such reception of revelation was something which caused the prophet a severe bodily shock.... Ezekiel relates how he sat on the ground awe-struck and unable to speak a word for seven days after his call" (Ezek. 3:15).[38] The prophet does not speak for himself, he does not announce what *he* thinks is just or good; rather, he speaks for God. Any other seemingly prophetic trait (other than, in the Christian context, conformity with the original source of revelation) is incidental.

Advance Men of the *Zeitgeist*

Modern self-styled prophets are primarily intellectuals (usually affluent seminary professors, ecclesiastical officials, and religious journalists) who, unlike ordinary parish clergy, are free from pressures exerted by rank-and-file church members. Their concerns are primarily those of the secular progressive intellectuals. Inasmuch as it is this intellectual elite which nourishes, promotes, and defines the *Zeitgeist*, it should not be surprising to see these prophets act as advance men of the *Zeitgeist*, as agents of mankind's Promethean aspirations. The enemies of the modern prophet, like those of the intellectual, are the unradicalized masses, the self-centered "silent majority," the unenlightened "hard hats," in other words, those supposedly messianic classes who refuse their destiny, who are always dragging their feet on the road to the millenium, who are just not "with-it." Lest this sound like a caricature, allow me to cite at length the words of Daniel Callahan, himself one of the most prestigious left-wing Catholics in America: "...I think there is a very real danger in the way left-wing Catholicism has become so respectable among secular intellectuals. I am writing this at a very nice desk, in a very nice house, and most of the money for these amenities has come from the unsought but profitable business of being known as a left-wing OK Catholic, one who can be counted on to knock the same things in the Church that most enlightened secular minds have always knocked.... I suspect that many of us left-wing Catholics are being had these days, and I worry about that. The game of being more-radical-than-thou is a big one in left-wing Catholicism. The coincidence between this radicalism and upper-level main-line secular American intellectual values is worthy of continual suspicion. On the whole, I don't think I will be happy with left-wing Catholicism until it has learned how to be prophetic to the upper-strata of American secular liberalism; at present, we are just trailing along behind, happy to provide it our theological blessing. It is not hard at all to be prophetic in the face of conservative Christianity; or in the face of a status quo racist, warmongering society; or in the face of bureaucratic bishops. But it is extraordinarily hard to be prophetic to hippies, New Leftists, and those who are already with-it to an extraordinary degree."[39]

In sum, an orthodox Christian is one who is extremely skeptical of those *Zeitgeist mitlaeufer*, those "OK" Christians, those "prophets," who are able to spot the "finger of the Divine" in political events, who sacralize human Progress, and who speak a word, not from God, but from the Spirit of the Age.

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27. Charles C. West, *Communism and the Theologians*, New York, 1958, pp. 65 and 55. Cf. J. Hromádka, *Impact of History on Theology: Thoughts of a Czech Pastor*, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1970, p. 37.
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32. "Barth to Bereczky: A Letter," *The Christian Century*, LXIX (July 30, 1952), p. 876.
33. Karl Loewith, *Meaning in History*, Chicago, 1949, p. 196.
34. Paul Ramsey, *Who Speaks for the Church?*, New York, 1967, p. 167.
35. Letter to *The Christian Century*, LXXX (May 15, 1963), p. 649. There is a minoritarian, but not heretical, current in Christianity which interprets Old and New Testament prophecy "literally" and believes God is working through the political events of the day in preparation for the apocalyptic Second Coming of Christ. Here, Providence is manifest: however, these Christians do not set themselves up as new prophets with a new word from God on how to usher in the Kingdom; rather they simply interpret established prophecy. Most of them are apolitical and tend not to confuse Providence with their favorite political projects.
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Philip Vander Elst

A Year of Disgrace

Nineteen seventy-four should be remembered as a year of dishonor, because during its course Yasir Arafat was feted and lionized by the UN General Assembly. That such a warm welcome should be reserved for the chief of a gang responsible for the innocent blood spilt at Munich, Ma'alot, and Bet'sha'an is an alarming commentary on the moral temper of these times. To the perceptive souls for whom nothing done by the United Nations comes as a surprise, this may appear a naive exclamation rather on a par with that of the British trade union delegate who, at an international conference in Moscow in the thirties, protested that any Communist propaganda which involved the use of the lie as a political weapon was immoral and therefore surely unacceptable to those assembled! Nonetheless, we should beware of allowing a weary cynicism, however well grounded, to deter us from enumerating the failings of Western diplomacy during the last twenty-five years. Far from being a futile exercise, drawing up the balance sheet reminds us of the essential fragility of freedom and the Rule of Law, now under attack from the most illiberal quarters.

A whole generation has passed during which the boundaries of liberty have steadily receded and our world has become more dangerous and unstable than for many lifetimes. What is more heartrending, this evolution has been almost entirely the product of avoidable neglect and shortsightedness, with Western policy suffering one setback after another by default. The lessons of postwar history are uncomfortable but we would do well to refresh our memories with them.

Victory over Hitler was followed by the abandonment of Eastern Europe and one hundred million people to the Soviet Union, all because the Allies permitted themselves to be duped by Stalin at Yalta and Potsdam. While Nazi war criminals were being successfully called to account for their atrocities, a million civilian refugees from Soviet Russia were forcibly repatriated by the Allies and sent to face the firing squad or a slow death by forced labor. (This relatively unknown but disgraceful chapter in our history—1945-46—is documented in detail in *The Gulag Archipelago*.) So much that was gained for the cause of freedom by valor, faith, and self-sacrifice was thus destroyed by weakness and blindness. The legacy? Heroic uprisings against unendurable tyranny in East Berlin in 1953 and Hungary in 1956 which flickered brightly for an inspiring moment, only to be brutally extinguished while the rest of the world sat by, impotent spectators of an inevitable tragedy. Just as the civilized community evaded its responsibilities in the thirties and allowed Nazism to rise and devour Austria and Czechoslovakia, so it betrayed its trust as the postwar custodian of freedom. The victims of this faintheartedness? Three million Europeans dead in purges, executions, and labor camps, since 1945.

The growth of the Communist colonial empire has, alas, not been the sole measure of the failure of Western statesmanship. That the area of the globe enjoying freedom under law has shrunk so pitifully resulted as much from the ill-judged alacrity with which the British and the French prematurely jettisoned their overseas possessions. Instead of ushering in the new millennium of peace, emancipation, and majority rule, so eagerly awaited by the misguided shepherds of the Left, these alien fruits of our civilization have rotted away in the hands of rulers whose desire for power has not been matched by a corresponding sense of moral and constitutional responsibility. Throughout Africa, personal rights have been trampled upon, legal safeguards torn up, and arbitrary government imposed. There has been an embarrass-

ing abundance of military coups and palace revolutions, and tribal warfare and racial persecution have been common occurrences. Ghana, formerly under the corrupt and despotic Nkrumah, is now managed by a coterie of army officers; Uganda is led by a power-drunk general who has despoiled and expelled fifty thousand Asians and who disciplines his cabinet by assassination; Tanzania lives beneath a harsh dictatorship which—so we learn from the findings of Amnesty International—does not scruple to torture and imprison dissidents by the thousands; President Kaunda of Zambia, fervent advocate of "democracy" in Rhodesia, runs a one-party state and interferes with the freedom of the judiciary; Ethiopia is now in the grip of revolutionary terror as the new leaders struggle among themselves for absolute power, over the bodies of 50 recently executed ministers and officials; President Bokassa of the Central African Republic has petty thieves mutilated and personally supervises beatings and tortures; Nigeria is still recovering from one of the bloodiest civil wars on record; likewise the Sudan, after years of fighting during which the formerly Arab-dominated government tried to exterminate entire Negro communities in the South.

The history of Africa since the 1960s, which began with the Congo debacle, has been tragic. Nothing, in all honesty, that happened under colonial rule, can match this record. The colonial period had its share of abuses and exploitation but these blemishes were not typical and were offset by striking general advances in health, nutrition, industry, agriculture, law, administration, science, and exploration. Above all, cannibalism and the slave traffic (which existed, for instance, between victorious tribes and Arab and Portuguese slavers in Central and West Africa) were abolished and a reign of peace and order established which the continent has never known since.

It may be that colonialism, however benevolent, is inherently unjustifiable. It may be thought that the right of national or ethnic self-determination ought never to be infringed and that consequently it was right for Europe to pursue a policy of scuttle (many eminent figures have argued this). The fact still remains that the only chance Africa ever had of evolving in a liberal-humanitarian direction was under colonial tutelage, and that the headlong retreat from "imperialism" has only produced a recrudescence of authoritarianism and savagery. Moreover, it was inconsistent as well as naive for the "enlightened" intelligentsia to have sought to force Africa into a liberal mould utterly foreign to its traditions and yet to have refused to will the necessary means, which is exactly what the colonial experiment represented. In this sense anticolonial left-wingers have always been paper imperialists betraying their self-proclaimed humanistic mission. Their currents of otherworldly idealism have merely led to the victory of the sacred cow of "national liberation" at the expense of the individual. Needless to say, the beneficiary has not been the African on the street or in the village but a venal political caste which has used power to line its pockets and gratify its lusts. One remembers what Madame Roland said when facing the guillotine: "Liberty! How many crimes are committed in thy name!" Now, nearly two hundred years later, human beings have once more been sacrificed to abstract dogma simply because, in Yeats' words: "the best lack all conviction while the worst are filled with a passionate intensity."

"The worst are filled with a passionate intensity—so it is indeed, and nowhere are they to be found in greater numbers than in the United Nations, which, as Solzhenitsyn rightly described it in his Nobel Prize speech ("One Word of Truth"), "is not a United Nations organization but a united governments organi-

zation where all governments stand equal: those which are freely elected, those imposed forcibly, and those which have seized power with weapons." That this body should be regarded in liberal circles as the conscience of the world when more than half its member states are dictatorships is an irony that Voltaire would have savored. His amused contempt would have been further excited if he could see how incongruously the United States—leader of the Free World—subsidizes an organization dominated by the most backward and tyrannical countries.

The story of the UN is disgraceful, as those who remember what it did in Katanga will agree, but it has been documented elsewhere and need not take up further attention in these pages. What is of more pressing concern is that after making a mess of Africa, well-meaning politicians are once more on their way to destroying civilized standards, this time in the Middle East.

For a quarter of a century the right of Israel to a peaceful and settled existence as an independent state has been close to our hearts. If any people has earned this right it surely has been the Jews. After a bitter night of exile, persecution, and genocide, in spite of which the Jews have made an unparalleled contribution to the arts of civilization, they have returned to their ancient homeland and converted its deserts into green pastures, orange groves, and modern cities. But these remarkable achievements have been constantly put in jeopardy by the virulent hostility of Israel's Arab neighbors. From the time of the British Mandate—when Arab terrorists, under the leadership of the notorious pro-Nazi Mufti of Jerusalem, launched unprovoked attacks on Jewish settlements—to the Yom Kippur War, the Arabs have given Israel no rest.

After the UN partition of Palestine in 1948, then supported even by the Soviet Union, the armies of five Arab states promptly violated the new boundaries and marched into Israel in the first act of armed aggression seen since the end of World War II. The Secretary General of the Arab League then, Azzam Pasha, defined the aim of the invasion in these terms: "[This] will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades" (BBC, May 15, 1948).

In 1967 Arab armies again mustered on Israel's precarious frontiers and Arab heads of state, Nasser in particular, again openly announced their candid intention of "driving the Jews into the sea." A vicious hate campaign was whipped up by Arab propaganda, much of it organized by ex-Nazis who had become employees of the Egyptian and Syrian governments, and Israel was only saved from a terrible fate by her pre-emptive strike. Thus for 26 years the only genuine liberal democratic state in the Middle East has had to fight off the combined assaults of countries led by some of the most reactionary and militaristic regimes of our day (such as Egypt, which had no scruples about using poison gas in the war in Yemen) and supported by our greatest contemporary imperialist power: the USSR.

One might be forgiven for believing, against this background, that the overriding concern of Western policy in this part of the globe would be for the protection of the interests of Israel, a line of action dictated arguably by expediency and definitely by morality. Israel *is* politically in our camp and represents a potentially civilizing force from which liberal ideas and technical and scientific "know-how" could radiate outwards, providing an invaluable catalyst for the economic development of the surrounding region. It is our misfortune, however, to live in an age in which—despite our politicians' moralistic bombast about South Africa—genuine moral considerations have rarely exerted so little influence on foreign affairs. As for *raison d'état*, democratic governments have a tendency to take the short- and not the long-term view of any matter. Today the conscience of the West is burdened with the problem of the Palestinians for which Israel is held largely to blame, and the nations of Western Europe are more interested in getting on with the oil sheiks from month to month than in seeing that justice is done and aggression deterred in the Middle East.

The problem of the Palestinian refugees was largely created by the Arabs themselves, because they deliberately plunged Israel into a full-scale war in 1948 during which the Palestinians fled so as not to be caught up in the fighting. There were five hundred thousand Jewish refugees from the countries of the Arab League who arrived destitute in Israel in the same period to escape unremitting persecution, an episode in history that is seldom recalled. Moreover, the oil-rich Arab states have done nothing to resettle the Palestinians despite the establishment by the UN in 1952 of a $200 million dollar fund for this purpose and despite Israel's repeatedly declared readiness to compensate the refugees for their abandoned lands. We know all these things but does this affect the stance of our governments? Apparently not. They go crawling to OPEC, begging for preferential treatment and trying to curry favor through demanding that Israel risk physical annihilation by going back to her indefensible pre-1967 borders. They demand a solution of the refugee question at the expense of Israel, helped along of course by a bit of terrorism from the PLO. They (especially West Germany) release hijackers from prison at the first hint of the possibility of reprisals. No surrender to blackmail is too base as long as it avoids the terrible hardship of a year passing without any increase in the living standards of the Western consumer. A temporary spell of severe fuel rationing seems too high a price to pay for the sake of our ultimate values and interests. And to what avail is this strategy of appeasement? The Arabs have simply hardened their attitudes and Kissinger's shuttle-diplomacy has been ruined by their intransigence.

How long can the West carry on in these footsteps if it is to remain true to its highest ideals? How are free societies to maintain themselves if they are unwilling to face their enemies with the determination and clarity of purpose that President Kennedy showed in the Cuban Missile Crisis? Wherever one turns one's gaze, the omens are worrying.

One does not have to be a fanatical adherent of the "domino theory" to realize that the American refusal to continue adequate military aid to South Vietnam is bound to have dangerous psychological repercussions throughout the world. The abandonment of Indochina inevitably reduces the credibility of the American military guarantees in Europe and undermines the deterrent effect of NATO. Worse still, demonstrations of the failure of America's will encourage Soviet adventurism and increase the dangers of war arising through sudden political miscalculation—of the kind Khrushchev was guilty of in the early sixties. The potential seriousness of the global situation is reinforced at the moment by Portugal's accelerating drift towards autocratic Communism, which menaces NATO's southern flank. Concurrently, there is the growing imbalance on the ground and in the air (about 4:1) between the forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, aggravated by the United Kingdom's latest defense cuts.

It is a truism that in the past, empires and states have suffered destruction through internal decay and moral abdication as much as at the hands of foreign foes—witness Athens and Rome. Now, a similar fate threatens to overtake *us* because of our incapacity to form a more robust and realistic view of the trends which threaten our liberties. It must never be forgotten that free societies have been scarce in mankind's history, the most successful barely spanning three centuries. It would therefore be an even greater tragedy if they were eventually to disappear because too many of our statesmen cling to the illusions of what James Burnham, in a famous phrase, described as "the liberal package deal."

Oswald Spengler long ago predicted the decline and fall of the West. Are we to meekly endure that he should be proved right? □

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E.C. Pasour, Jr.

The Abuse of Land Use Planning

In June 1974, the U.S. House of Representatives defeated a national land use planning bill. The bill would have provided $100 million a year over the next eight years to encourage states to plan the use of land—for shopping centers and large housing developments, around airports and highway interchanges, and in areas of "critical environmental concern."

The House action was greeted by howls of outrage and dismay by, among others, the Sierra Club, the *New York Times*, and Senator Jackson. Similar land use planning legislation has surfaced again this year. What can one say about the potential effects of legislation of this kind? What are the implications for local control of land? Will such legislation, in fact, improve the efficiency of land use?

Objectives of Land Use Controls

Many people view the current "unplanned" use of land as ugly, chaotic, and inefficient. They worry about the use of prime agricultural land and other open land for roads, houses, and other urban uses, and they say that more efficient land use requires a "comprehensive" land use plan. Such a plan would classify land into various categories—e.g., urban; land to become urban; agricultural and forestry; and conservation and preservation—and would employ legal means to restrict the use of land to its designated category. These measures include zoning, use value property taxation, and land acquisition or the purchase of development rights.

The assumption underlying the above view of the need for comprehensive land use controls is that land allocation currently is not planned but is haphazard and inefficient. More sophisticated critics realize that the market allocates land just as it does potatoes or autos; these critics refer instead to the failure of the market to take account of various beneficial or undesirable side effects associated with land use. That is, the use of land by one individual often imposes costs or confers benefits on other people. As indicated later, however, there is little reason to expect that the political process will improve the efficiency of land use through comprehensive land use controls. First, consider the effect of several tools commonly proposed to implement land use plans.

Use Value Taxation

A number of states have enacted property tax legislation designed to preserve agricultural and open land, especially around urban areas. The legislation is usually in the form of "use value" taxation which enables qualifying property to be taxed on the basis of its value in its current use instead of its market value. California, for example, adopted an "open land" program in 1965. It authorized open space tax valuation for four classes of property: scenic beauty, natural resources, recreation, and food and fiber production.

Pressures for special treatment of agricultural, forestry, and other open land has led to legislative action providing for differential assessment of such lands in about half the states. The provisions of this legislation are quite different in the various states, but the results have been similar: special tax treatment alone is not effective in preventing the conversion of open land to urban uses. The property tax is not responsible for the conversion of farm and other open land to urban uses; that conversion is caused mainly by the increased demand for land for such uses, and preferential tax treatment does nothing to lessen this demand for other uses. Since landowners want to preserve the option to sell their land at a high price, voluntary use value laws have little effect in holding land in agricultural and other open uses. Consequently, preferential tax policies designed to increase aesthetic and environmental benefits such as open space, scenic beauty, fresh air (hereafter referred to as "environmental amenities") cannot be expected to improve on the market allocation of land.

Zoning

Zoning represents the use of the police power of the state to restrict property rights in land use. It is a tool commonly used in implementing planning decisions to protect amenities associated with particular uses of land. Compensation to landowners is not legally required even though the attenuation of property rights through zoning often reduces property values. In practice, zoning classifications are likely to be modified and changed in response to market forces or to meet desires of vocal interested parties.

Even if it is effective in restricting land to particular uses, however, zoning has major limitations in increasing the efficiency of the land market. The zoning of a major share of land for one use reduces the supply and increases the price of land for other uses. And thus, to restrict property rights on zoned land is quite often to confer windfall gains and losses. Zoning a major share of land for agriculture, for example, will increase the value of other land both immediately and in the future—as more and more land is used for housing and other nonfarm purposes. Current holders of nonagricultural (or open) land will benefit from this zoning policy, while owners of land zoned agricultural will bear a cost where the market value of the land is higher in other uses.

There are persuasive objections to imposing the costs of open space amenities on the owners of open space (as by zoning). First, it generates an arbitrary income redistribution from some landowners to other landowners. Second, it precludes the possibility of any market balancing of costs and benefits. Where individuals receiving benefits are not the same as those incurring costs, and are more numerous, too much land is likely to be held in open uses. Finally, if the social value of open land is greater than its market value for other uses, the community can afford to pay the owner its market value.

Land use control proposals often lead to the imposition of their proponents' aesthetic and environmental values rather than a demonstrated improvement in the current pattern of land use. In Hawaii, Vermont, and other areas which have enacted environmental control legislation, it is increasingly becoming clear that there is a conflict between preserving open space and other environmental amenities and providing housing and other services which use land. As the relationship between costs of housing (and other land uses) and the preservation of "green belts" (or other open spaces) around urban areas becomes more widely recognized, there will probably be less public support for environmental amenities.

The acquisition of land in fee simple (public ownership) is the surest way for the public to retain land for a particular use. This approach is often criticized for being expensive both in terms of the tax revenue necessary to purchase the land and in terms of the effect on the tax base. It should be pointed out, however, that the social cost of land acquisition is no higher than the social cost of zoning. A major difference is that zoning costs are borne mainly by private property owners and are not highly visible, whereas costs of land acquired publicly are reflected in the public budget. (Of course, land acquired by condemnation under the government's right of eminent domain represents an erosion of private property rights even though compensation is paid to the landowner.)

A similar approach involves some form of easement in which the owner transfers some of the rights of the land to a unit of government. The land might be held in a particular use for a specified period of time through a restrictive agreement. The owner would be compensated for the rights he gives up. The advantage of easements over zoning as a way of providing environmental amenities is that the cost of maintaining land in a particular use is apparent and the costs are largely borne by the people who presum-

ably benefit from the policy, viz., the general public.

The argument is frequently made that public acquisition of land will improve land use by protecting the public from land speculators. The land speculator, however, improves the operation of the land market by bearing the burden of the uncertain future. He loses when he incorrectly anticipates the future. Thus, there is a built-in safeguard to make present market prices reflect expected future conditions. Public acquisition has no similar safeguards, because public officials do not bear the costs of a bad decision—at least not to the same extent as private entrepreneurs. This suggests a problem in providing for beneficial side effects associated with land through the public acquisition of land or land rights. There is no market test for the value of these side effects (amenities) related to various uses of land. Instead, the test is provided through the political process. However, as the following discussion indicates, there are innate difficulties in reflecting public sentiment through the collective choice process via planning bodies.

A Critique of Pure Altruism

There are two fundamental problems which limit the efficiency of results produced by regulatory or planning bodies. First, planning commissions and zoning boards are often captured by the regulated. This result is not an accident but is innate in the political process. The self-interest motive is a good predictor of individual behavior in the citizen's role as bureaucrat as well as in the private sphere of activity.

Let us assume, however, that only individuals imbued with the public spirit are appointed to a land use planning board and that they attempt to subordinate self-interest and follow the public interest. The second fundamental problem is that a perfectly altruistic motive does not assure an optimal decision. Since there is seldom a "common interest" but instead a multitude of competing special interests, the members have no way of unilaterally determining the public interest. That is, there is no way that a planning body can determine the optimal policy with respect to land use independently of the electorate. The planning process, once viewed as objective and technical in nature, is increasingly being recognized as involving value judgments and the necessity to make political choices. The basic question which must be resolved is whether such a process can take account of the diversity of individual interests as efficiently as the market. There is a great deal of evidence which suggests that the market is much more flexible and responsive to changing conditions.

The optimal amount of land in any use is likely to change over time. Although land use plans may be developed which would appear more efficient than present market allocation, such plans are likely to become quickly obsolete in a society characterized by rapid changes in science and technology. Future discoveries and new ways of viewing facts cannot be predicted. Ecology, pollution, and the "energy crisis" are current examples of issues largely ignored a decade ago which have significantly altered prevailing attitudes toward land use.

In view of these considerations and the uncertainties of time, there is little likelihood that comprehensive land use controls on a county or state basis will yield results more consistent with the desires of the people than will competitive markets. A central planning body is almost certain to have less knowledge and information about the value of particular parcels of land in various uses than the individual owners or potential owners of the land. Any land use legislation will, of necessity, be a compromise effort to accommodate politically powerful forces. This process is not likely to lead to the best use of land, for efficient land use is likely to have only a tenuous connection with the priorities of political power and politics.

Implications

The effect on the potential for corruption of public officials is one point overlooked by many people favoring comprehensive land use controls. Zoning or planning decisions (if effective) instantly change land values, imposing capital gains or losses on landowners. Such windfall gains and losses associated with rezoning or planning decisions increase the incentive to bribe public officials. The impersonal nature of freely formed market decisions stands in marked contrast.

The comments of this paper do not suggest that institutional arrangements affecting land use cannot be made to increase the efficiency of land use. In some cases, the cost of land in a particular use should be increased to cover undesirable side effects (or increased costs for public services) associated with land in that particular use. Such changes to improve the efficiency of the land market, however, are fundamentally different from proposals to substitute centralized planning for the market in allocating land for various uses.

Current proposals to institute comprehensive land use controls coordinated at the federal level, if enacted, are likely to have far-reaching unanticipated consequences. The legislation defeated by the House (but passed by the Senate in 1973) did not provide for sanctions against

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states which failed to participate. Senator Jackson and many others, however, favor the use of sanctions against states which fail to adopt state land use programs. Senator Jackson would use "crossover sanctions" to force the states to participate. Such sanctions, for example, might take the form of a loss of a part of a state's federal aid for highways, airports, etc.

The implications of federal sanctions for local control of land are clear. What may not be so clear is that use of land under federal dictates may bear little relationship to the desired pattern of land use as determined at the local level. A topical example is the granting of a license by the Federal Power Commission to dam the New River in western North Carolina. It now appears that this action will be taken in spite of widespread opposition by the people in the area and by their elected representatives. Regardless of whether federal sanctions are employed against states which fail to adopt land use plans which meet federal guidelines, comprehensive land use controls represent an erosion of private property rights and offer little hope for improving the efficiency of land use.

In assessing efficiency, the present system of land use should be compared with an attainable alternative. Demonstrating that comprehensive land use controls *could* improve land use is not the same as demonstrating that actual comprehensive land use controls *would* do so. There is a difference between the actual and ideal working of the political process just as there is for the market. In view of our recent experiences with government regulatory agencies (FAA, ICC, etc.) there is little reason to expect that the political process would work better than the market. It seems ironic that a vastly greater degree of involvement in land use decisions by government at all levels is being urged at the same time that public satisfaction with the performance of the public sector is so low. □

The Talkies

by Benjamin Stein

The Day of the Locust

Powerlessness and frustration, frustration and powerlessness. A beautiful young girl dances in the arms of a frightened and repressed middle-aged man. Both are lonely and despairing. Yet as the camera focuses in on them, we see that their arms are tense, holding them apart rather than pulling them together for solace and affection. On her face is a look of almost complete forlornness, as if she were thinking, "I cannot even get a strong response from this pathetic, lonely man." On his face is a look of terror at being so close to the temptations he has avoided all his life. He looks as if he doesn't know whether to flee or to crush her against him. They dance in the kitchen of a Hollywood cottage, in the dark, and as the scene fades, we see that both are crying silently—so that the other will not know.

The definitive film on the critical problem of modern life is the new movie *The Day of the Locust*. It is a film so good that after seeing it you have to check your memory to be sure that you really saw what you think you saw, and not just what you hoped you would see.

Nathanael West wrote the novel between 1936 and 1938, while he was working on "B" pictures in Hollywood. It is the story of life among the powerless and dispossessed in Hollywood in the 1930s and it is a fine little book, but the movie has taken that book and raised its visions to the cosmic level.

Tod Hackett (played by William Atherton) is a young artist fresh out of Yale who is working for a big Hollywood studio. He is naive but hungry. He lives in a cheap motel across from the beautiful Faye Greener (played with genius by Karen Black), star-crazed teenage daughter of a dying former clown turned door-to-door salesman. Hackett falls madly in love with Faye but she spurns him. "I could never let myself be loved by anyone who wasn't rich, and I could never love anyone who wasn't criminally handsome," she says. "Sorry. That's just the way I am."

While Tod is frustrated by Faye and Faye is frustrated by being poor and unknown, Faye's father Harry (played, as if he had written the book, by Burgess Meredith) staggers around Hollywood trying to sell silver polish. He creeps into the house of a visiting Midwestern hotel clerk, Homer Simpson (played by Donald Sutherland). When Faye comes to find her father, she runs into Homer, and Homer is simply knocked into outer space by her. However, his frustrations have become so much a part of his personality that he makes no attempt to be anything other than a servile and avuncular figure to her.

When Harry Greener dies, Faye takes up prostitution to pay for the funeral. Then she moves in with Homer Simpson. He waits on her hand and foot, and she despises him for it. Their relationship involves no sex but is overpowered by the ever-present sexuality of his smothered volcano of desire and her taunting of him.

A great deal more happens, leading to ruin for all who were not already ruined. If anyone has not read the book, I will spare him the pain of learning the ending. It is a blockbuster.

The book was largely a visual book. Author West tried to convey the look of pinched bitterness and seething fury on the faces of people in Hollywood. They had worked hard all their lives to get enough money to come out to California. Once they got there, they realized they had been cheated, and they weren't happy about it. (Originally, in fact, West had titled the novel *The Cheated*.) Their anger, West believed, was the most destructive force in civilization. It could bring down all order, he believed.

West was not a powerful stylist of despair like Joan Didion. But he tried over and over again to draw a portrait in words of the faces he was talking about. I think he would have been extremely happy with the movie. Director John Schlesinger has understood perfectly that it is nuance rather than plot which makes the novel a powerhouse. And it is in the individual looks on the individual faces that the movie's power lies. When the action does become dominant, it is the externalization of a seething fury which we had seen long before and could have told was coming.

Someone named Marion Dougherty has cast the movie virtually perfectly. When I read the book after seeing the movie (I had also read it before, just to be safe), I could see the characters fitting perfectly into their roles. Atherton was Tod Hackett; Meredith was Harry Greener. Most important of all, the character whom I had difficulty visualizing, the central character, Faye Greener, was brought to life in an eerily perfect way. She not only became a literary figure, but she made the literary figure into flesh and blood so that I can now see Faye as people I have known.

The movie does that for all the characters and for the whole story. It shows us a desperation and anger which is so close to what we actually see around us that we recognize that this is what our world has come to. The movie of West's book is a guidebook to understanding what people around us are feeling and, more important, what we are feeling ourselves.

The Day of the Locust is a powerful social document as well as a personal and psychological statement. It talks about what happens in a society which creates stars (in this case, movie stars), tells people that they should be stars too, and also tells them that they should worship what they are not but "should" be. People become intensely ambitious, then frustrated, then angry. The final upshot, says West, is The Day of the Locust. In fact, some might say that in the anger of people at their institutions generated by the constant whipping up of false expectations by the media, we are already seeing a slow-motion day of the locust. The anger on that day will not only be against Dick Powell and Myrna Loy, but also against each other and society itself.

Until that day comes, the battle is fought within. People become corroded and full of hate from their frustrations. The movie makes no overt statement about how to improve the situation. Tod Hackett shows what his solution is by simply leaving the scene. He has implicitly said that he will no longer live in the land where dreams are sustenance. He will go to a place where expectations are more normal and down to earth. If there are less gaudy hopes, there is less disappointment.

Still, the movie is not a preachy movie. It just lays out the situation. It is our situation, by and large, in America, and it is dangerous. However, there is hope. A society which can make movies as splendid as *The Day of the Locust* is not beyond redemption. □

Book Review/John P. Sisk

The Motherland of Invention

Perhaps the best approach to Hugh Kenner's new book would be that declaration of American literary independence, Emerson's "American Scholar." "We have listened too long to the courtly muses of Europe," Emerson says in the peroration of this essay. "We will walk on our own feet; we will work with our own hands; we will speak our own minds." In effect, he is asking for the homemade world that is Kenner's subject: the American reaction to Modernism as seen in the writings of three overlapping generations—those of William Carlos Williams, William Faulkner, and Louis Zukofsky—which resulted in "a fifty year reshaping of the American language." How Emerson himself would have reacted to writing so strikingly and even shockingly homemade by his pre-Civil War standards God only knows. It is quite possible that he would have said something similar to what Wordsworth once said about him: "Where is the thing which now passes for philosophy in Boston to stop?"

For Kenner, certainly, the homemade world of American modernism does not stop with the production of climactic masterworks, but carries into the present age of transition "when the very question gets raised, what the written word may be good for." In any event, we begin his book in 1912 with Ezra Pound's Emersonian declaration of belief "in the imminence of an American Risorgimento"; and we end it with the fiction of Nabokov, Barth, and Pynchon, struck with the oddity that "the American novel has been yielding to that sense of the arbitrariness of language that provided the poets' opportunity of the 1920s." In between we spend time with Amy Lowell, Fitzgerald, Wallace Stevens, Williams, Marianne Moore, Hemingway, Charles Olson, and Faulkner. But since the book is "neither a survey nor an honor roll" we spend no time at all with Robert Lowell, Robert Frost, Hart Crane, Thomas Wolfe, or E. E. Cummings.

With or without the latter group of writers, the book goes over territory that since World War II has been beaten hard by the insistent feet of critics, and not a few of the footprints have been made by Kenner himself. Do we really see anything new this time out? I think we do, not simply because of a splendidly clarifying emphasis on the "homemade" quality of American modernism, but also because of Kenner's skill in relating this theme to his awareness that "American literature is tricky for the critic" since American writers "invent the criteria by which we must understand them." This inventiveness is why they were able to hammer out a poetic "as American as the Kitty Hawk plan"; why "the new language (new to each user) is like the new world. You never know what you are going to find"; why Hemingway's fiction resembles the poems of Stevens and Moore, "who resemble one another in having invented new kinds of poems"; why Williams when he called a poem a machine made out of words "was setting it in the field where America's prime energies have been expended since Henry Ford."

A Homemade World:
The American Modernist Writers

by Hugh Kenner
Knopf $8.95

But the inventiveness of American writers has also been connected with a vein of charlatanry that could be combined, as in Pound, with purity of heart; with the homemade deficiencies that so often make Fitzgerald's Nick Carraway "sententious to a boring degree"; with the tendency of Hemingway's small full words "to contract and grow fewer and approximate to a grunt"; with the fact that in Stevens' world "there are no actions and no speeches, merely ways of looking at things," that Williams flounders about as he tries to explain imagination and his variable foot, and that Olson, in the process of graduating from amateur to impresario, "indulged in a rhetoric not easily distinguished from bluff."

Nothing, however, is more important to the integrity of the book than a factor one is not likely to be struck with in the writing of academic people: the presence of the author as style. Sinuous, tough, a nice combination of the formal and the colloquial, Kenner's style might suggest to the hasty reader a mind discursive to the point of being haphazard. In the brilliant chapter "Small Ritual Truths," for instance, the focus begins on Hemingway but shifts quickly to Fitzgerald, Eliot, and the objective correlative; next to pertinent developments in the early cinema and to anticipations of the cinema in Flaubert; to Yeats on the equation of the perfection of life with the perfection of style, and Pater on the maximization of special moments; to role playing in Joyce, Yeats, and Eliot; to the crippling simplicities of Sherwood Anderson; to the rhetoric of evasion in relation to the objective correlative; finally to the ultimate frustration of the one true sentence and the extent to which Hemingway's pursuit of it shares with Hugh Hefner's *Playboy* philosophy the terminal point of *nada*. The focus is all richly under control, ultimately all about Hemingway, all preparatory to the discovery not only of a weakness in Hemingway's strength but to a flaw in his nurturing environment.

Kenner is properly admired for knowing a great deal about a great number of subjects. More important, however, none of his knowledge is rattling around loose in his head. I am not as enthusiastic about

Buckminster Fuller (the subject of his previous book) as Kenner is, but I can believe that he is attracted to Fuller because he sees in him an image of the holistic comprehensive imagination that they both admire. Kenner moves as naturally from Zukofsky's poetry to the primitive Kitty Hawk airplane, or from Hemingway's style to the implications of Hefner's philosophy, as Fuller moves from southern California zoning ordinances to problems in geodesics. In fact, it is this capacity to move easily across boundaries that made it possible for Kenner in *Bucky* to put Poe alongside Fuller in order to see in both the striking homemade combination of crank and genius.

Kenner (who is now a professor at Johns Hopkins) has remarked that "I do not live in a box labeled 'Eng. Lit.' out of which I occasionally climb. The subject of all my books is the twentieth century life of the mind." The figures he has hitherto chosen to write about—Eliot, Joyce, Pound, Beckett, Wyndham Lewis—indicate a sharp eye for the points of observation from which this life can be most instructively viewed. Some Kenner-watchers may have been startled to see in a recent *New York Times Magazine* the report of his encounter with the Joyboy of sex, Alex Comfort. But Kenner's interest in Comfort (who since his arrival in America may himself have become homemade) is as inevitable as his interest in Pound and Fuller. No one concerned with the life of the mind in these times will fail to notice how that mind has complicated its problems with its hopes for sexual liberation. This is why (as I suspect Kenner knows) the *New York Review of Books* is not properly read if one omits the "personals." Once you are no longer confined to the box of "Eng. Lit.," *The Joy of Sex*—like the Kitty Hawk plane, the Model-T, the Geodesic Dome, and all those sensitive backpage lonely souls—is a legitimate concern of the critic who wants to see his subject in its proper context.

Indeed, the life of the twentieth century mind is such that it can be entered into only in proportion as the observer can come out of his box and move across the boundaries that separate social, political, and religious institutions, levels of culture, historical periods, philosophic perspectives, and academic disciplines. That Kenner can do this about as well as anyone helps to explain the excitement his work can generate in his reader. The boundary crossings have the effect of intersecting crosscuts that increase the tension of his prose. This is why *A Homemade World* has so few of those low-pressure moments which one learns to tolerate in even good books. It is a very "busy" piece of writing: one's expectation that unexpected and significant connections will be made is continually being fulfilled.

But it would be a mistake to think that Kenner quite literally climbs out of his box and leaves it behind him—just as it is a mistake to believe that one can be effectively at home in many cultures without being grounded in one of them. The dream of a comprehensivism beyond specialization is probably as doomed as is Alex Comfort's dream of an anarchic-pacifist utopia achieved through the elimination of sex hangups. To put it another way, specialization is itself our indispensable hangup. In any event, Kenner is first and everywhere, in this as in previous books, the specialist in literature—which is only to say that he speaks with authority when he writes as wonderfully as he does about the poetry of Moore, Stevens, and Williams, or about the fiction of Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Faulkner. Only a specialist in literature could say of Miss Moore that "she never allowed a fear of being thought poetic to deter her from accuracy," or of Faulkner that he "shows no special signs of thinking the old South more doomed than any other sector of humanity. It was simply the sector he knew."

But only a man who is at once a specialist and a good deal more besides could say of Stevens that "He tended to suppose that he was at grips with a religious or a philosophic crisis. But it was a writer's crisis purely, a poet's crisis, an episode in the history of nature poetry since Wordsworth. It is entangled in religion and philosophy: of course it is. But it existed, neatly, on the poetic plane...." The real bonus in the book is Kenner's ability to explicate literature out of the awareness of such entanglements. □

Book Review/Karl O'Lessker

Building Bridges in the East

Robert Moses is a problem for conservatives. With the possible exception of Huey Long, no one in our history has used the power of the state to more devastating effect—steamrollering private rights for allegedly public purposes with more skill, zest, dynamism, and utter unblinking ruthlessness. And yet he always identified himself as (and no doubt truly believed himself to be) a conservative. What is more, through most of his forty-year career as Construction Czar of New York City he was allied with some of the greatest capitalist institutions in America, not least of them the Rockefellers' Chase Manhattan Bank. (As we shall see, it was a Rockefeller who laid him low, but that doesn't dull the point.) And in his one fling at elective politics, Moses ran for governor as a conservative Republican challenger to that quintessential New Deal liberal, Herbert Lehman. (That he lost, in 1934, is testimony to the times. That he lost as badly as he did is testimony to his own monumental ineptitude for electoral politics. How else explain the fact that a man named Moses, a pure-blooded Jew, would repeatedly and angrily deny—in New York!—that he was Jewish?)

The problem Moses presents to conservatives is symbolic, to be sure, but none the less anguishing for that. For he is in an important sense the living embodiment of that schizophrenia that has characterized American conservatism since the time of Hamilton. I mean that dual commitment to genuine economic freedom on the one hand and to the use of state power for economic advantage on the other. All too often, as a mountain of muckraker documentation shows, conservative rhetoric has been a screen of words behind which men of wealth pillage the public domain. And those who prated loudest about free enterprise were those who most assiduously corrupted state legislators in the quest for law-endowed privilege.

The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York

by Robert A. Caro
Knopf $17.50

Robert Moses played this game to near-perfection, but with the difference that he measured *his* score in power rather than wealth. His biographer is persuasive on the point. After forty years of unparalleled opportunity for graft, a position from which any ordinary politician would certainly have emerged a multimillionaire, Moses is ending his days still needing to earn a living through writing and consulting.

The Wizard of Concrete

It is almost impossible to convey in less than book length the range of Robert Moses' powers and activities over four decades. It is not enough to say that he built all but one of New York City's

expressways, each of its seven bridges raised since 1931, nearly seven hundred playgrounds and as many or more baseball diamonds and tennis courts, Lincoln Center, the Coliseum, Shea Stadium, the United Nations; that on Long Island he built every one of the 416 miles of parkway and all its great beaches and parks; and that in the farthest reaches of upstate New York he built immense power dams along the St. Lawrence and even vaster ones at Niagara. Those are large achievements but tell far less than the fact that, as Construction Coordinator for the City, he personally approved the site and construction plans for each of the 1,082 public housing buildings erected between 1945 and 1958, containing 148,000 apartments and over half a million tenants. And not only public housing: "no public improvement of any type—not school or sewer, library or pier, hospital or catch basin—was built by any city agency... unless Robert Moses approved its design and location." Indeed the very shape of the city bears his imprint, for he added fifteen thousand acres of new land to its shorelines. But his influence was not confined to New York. The first administrator of the federal Interstate Highway System said flatly the System could not have been built without him. And his bitterest critic for thirty years, Lewis Mumford, said: "In the twentieth century, the influence of Robert Moses on the cities of America was greater than that of any other person."

Very early in his career, as a visionary idealistic good government reformer, Moses learned (the hard way: at the hands of Tammany Hall) that he would need power to achieve any of the dominating visions of his young life. And, as a protégé of Governor Al Smith, he set out to acquire all the power he could get his hands on. Soon it became a drug to him; he consumed it with the appetite of a Gargantua, reveled in it, enjoyed all its perquisites—except estate. During working hours (usually sixteen a day) he operated in imperial splendor, as for instance in having three fully staffed private dining rooms scattered throughout his domain on the chance that he might choose on the spur of the moment to dine in one or the other. Or better: in his very first New York State job, as president of the Long Island State Park Commission, he rented and lavishly furnished a grand suite of offices for himself and his friends, acquired limousines and chauffeurs for all, and spent no less than $63,089 on such "overhead expenses" out of a total beginning appropriation of $225,000.

That was the Moses style: imperial tastes, imperial arrogance. Only a man of extraordinary self-confidence would have dared to be quite that outrageous in his first public position. When the state's attorney general issued a statement detailing the extravagance of Moses' expenditures for cars and office furnishings, the Park Commissioner's reply "attacked the Attorney General for delays in searching title for proposed park acquisitions...." Nor was his confidence misplaced. That model of journalistic rectitude, the *New York Times*, handled the Attorney General's documented charges by calling them "an attempt at retaliation by Republicans on Governor Smith for his veto of the Thayer State Park bill," and buried the whole thing on an inside page. And when Moses offered his irrelevant counterattack, a *Times* editorial called it "a model of moderate statement."

It was like that throughout most of his career. With an absolute genius for public relations (except when he ran for governor) Moses enjoyed the nearly total adulation of the press and its near total support in each of his many furious battles with an array of opponents ranging from Long Island robber barons to good government reformers and spokesmen for the poor. It must have seemed to Moses, and with good reason, that the massed forces of the press stood ready, at a word from him, to scatter his opponents as rabble before an army. And his op-

ponents, potential as well as real, knew it only too well.

That was one pillar of his triumphal arch of power. The other, already referred to, was his alliance with some of the giants of New York's financial community. The way it worked was this. As chairman of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, Moses had virtual free rein to float great bond issues as he saw fit. For construction of the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge, for example, Triborough offered $300,000,000 in new bonds. A syndicate of underwriters purchased the entire issue for $295,760,851—and sold them the very same day for $300,570,851. (Lest anyone think that a five million dollar profit on a $300,000,000 investment isn't all that spectacular even for one day, I should note that it was an absolutely risk-free "investment"— financial institutions all over the East were clamoring for the privilege of being allowed to purchase Triborough bonds—"A very, very high quality instrument, you know," said a vice president of the Chemical Bank of New York, "the highest-yielding of any investment-grade security after tax.")

High yield was another key to Moses' popularity with the bankers. Because of his fiscal policies, Triborough bonds were unassailably gilt-edged. And they paid interest at a *tax-free* rate of over five percent—so much higher than it needed to be that, as Caro calculates, "over the life of a single bond issue, the one floated to finance the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge, bondholders would receive the almost incredible amount of $40,000,000 more than they would gladly have settled for."

If all this seems incomprehensible to anyone who understands the principles of sound financial management of public (or private) authorities, Caro explains his subject's motivation: "Moses' generosity had to be paid for out of the pockets of motorists, of course. If bondholders received tens of millions of dollars extra in interest, drivers would have to pay tens of millions of dollars extra in tolls.... But Moses wasn't concerned with the cost to the public. His concern was to enlist in his cause the banks who could use their power to push behind-the-scenes political leaders, as well as state legislators, city councilmen, borough presidents—and mayors and governors—into approving a public work that they might otherwise not have approved."

Power was the end and power was the means to the end. And "very probably the single most powerful financial institution on the face of the earth" was at that time the Chase Manhattan Bank. It was Chase that Moses selected to be trustee of Triborough's bonds, and Chase therefore that received the largest quantity of "service fees" associated with the bonds.

The press and the biggest of the banks were on Moses' side, and so were: the construction trades unions; the contractors; Tammany Hall; the Archdiocese of New York; the city's merchant princes, including both Gimbel of Gimbel's and Straus of Macy's; and, out of fear not only of his political power but of the dossiers he kept on each of them, the elected politicians. "Bob Moses has these files," recalled former City Council President Paul Screvane. "On at least twenty separate occasions when we were on the same side, I would say about someone, 'I don't think he'll go along,' and Bob would say, 'Well, goddamnit, he'd *better* go along! If he doesn't go along, I'll destroy the son of a bitch!' And he'd call for a file, and he would begin to quote chapter and verse. And sure enough [when the vote came], the fellow would go along."

There is some comfort to be taken in the fact that Moses' worst mistakes were the consequence of his worst moral features. The very first unraveling of the fabric of his immense reputation resulted from a typical act of Moses' contempt for the public he was supposed to be serving. Briefly put, he decided to pave over half an acre of Central Park in order to build a parking lot for a restaurant called Tavern-on-the-Green; and when the neighborhood mothers protested, he did as he always did: he ignored them. But these mothers (and fathers and single persons) were different. They were well-to-do, educated, influential. Moreover they understood the uses of public relations. And so, in an early phase of what became known as the Battle of Central Park, they blocked Moses' bulldozers with their bodies and baby carriages. It made a superb media event: "Within hours, every major radio station in New

York was telling its listeners the story.... That evening [it] was on every major television newscast. The next day, a picture of mothers and children lined up defiantly between the menacing machine and a large tree was displayed prominently in every newspaper in town."

So of course Moses beat a strategic retreat, right?

Wrong. A few days later, at one-thirty in the morning, under the personal command of a top Moses aide, Park Department troops moved in by moonlight, constructed a protecting fence, and brought in the bulldozer. "By the time daylight revealed the scene... and the first of the mothers came running into the park, the bulldozer had pushed over a big maple tree and Park Department axmen were chopping it into small pieces. And when the mothers tried to reach the machine, the policemen joined hands and politely but firmly stopped them at the fence.... There was nothing they could do except stand outside the fence and cry as the trees came down."

That was April 1956, and the hitherto unassailable reputation never recovered. It was not that very many people remembered the Battle of Central Park long after it was over. Rather, the savagery of Moses' methods impelled the newspapers—for the very first time—to inquire into the inner (if not innermost) workings of the Moses empire. It took little or no effort, for example, to find out that the chief beneficiary of the parking lot, Tavern-on-the-Green's private concessionaire, was paying the city only a fraction of what he should have been paying, keeping the rest for himself—and spending tens of thousands of dollars on lavish dinners and receptions ordered by Moses. Moses himself, it seems clear, never got a penny out of it (or out of any of the hundreds of similar deals by which he created fortunes for other men). It was only one more element in the power, and the display of power, he so relished.

And from Tavern-on-the-Green the newsmen moved into another Moses domain, public housing and urban renewal (he was Construction Coordinator for New York City as well as its Parks Commissioner). There they discovered not only corruption (none of it, again, ever going to Moses' personal financial benefit) but unexampled brutality toward the city's poor. Isolated "do-gooders" had been trying for years to tell about it; but the newspapers (with one exception, the *Post*) hadn't been interested. Now they were. And even, oh so belatedly, the *Times* began to contemplate its hero's handiworks and found them wanting. Moses was sorely to miss the adulation of the press when the most powerful antagonist he had ever had to face undertook to strip his power from him.

Exodus

How then *was* a man of such awesome power and implacable purpose finally brought down? The answer is deceptively simple. He finally had to confront a political superior as ruthless as himself and having not the slightest reason—personal, political, or financial—to fear him. And Nelson Rockefeller understood from the beginning that he could not *share* power with Moses in any areas of mutual concern; for Moses it had to be czardom or nothing. But in order to do the things *he* wanted to do as Governor—most particularly in the field of mass transportation—Rockefeller had to be able to exercise direction and authority in those areas. Thus it was Moses' own obduracy that transformed a normal "politics-as-the-art-of-compromise" contest into a zero-sum game: winner take all. It was a game, at long last, he could not win.

(One oughtn't overlook a key fact about Rockefeller, so nicely illuminated by a recently quoted remark of former President Nixon. Only two other men in America, said Nixon, understood the uses of power as well as he himself did: John Connally and Nelson Rockefeller. That degree of understanding, it seems to me, almost certainly bespeaks a precedent devotion to, indeed lust for, the object of attention, such that there is a virtual symbiosis between subject and object. In any event, no one in American politics is likely to deny the fact of Rockefeller's aptitude for the pursuit of power. On those grounds alone we should not be surprised that the new Governor quickly decided to eliminate his most formidable rival, the Power Broker.)

...The fascinating story of a transformation from lyric poet and good government idealist to the most ruthless corrupter of the political process in New York's history.

For all that, however, it was not Rockefeller who forced the issue but Moses. With that limitless arrogance so characteristic of him, Moses, in November 1962, offered the Governor his resignation from all five of his New York State jobs and dared Rockefeller to accept them (this, by the way, after humiliating his newly re-elected superior by refusing to receive or return his phone calls following a contentious meeting between them). And when it began to appear that Rockefeller might really accept the resignations, Moses eliminated any chance of reconciliation by issuing a savage press release (*prior* to any announcement by the Governor) declaring that Rockefeller had asked him to resign from one of those posts "so that he could put his brother Laurance in my place...."

Later in the same statement Moses added the gratuitious (if not inaccurate) charge that Rockefeller had repeatedly subjected him to "humiliating" treatment. In short, the master-builder not only constructed his own coffin but seized himself by the scruff of the neck and threw himself in.

But the single greatest source of Moses' power remained: chairmanship of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, with its huge cash surpluses and even greater bonding authority. Caro's account of how Moses in 1966 effortlessly brushed aside Mayor Lindsay's efforts to remove him, but how he then two years later fell before the incomparably more powerful strokes of Nelson Rockefeller's sword, is surely one of the great tales in American political history. I shall not detract from the potential reader's pleasure by outlining it here. It is enough to say that, despite Moses' age (79), his long run of public relations disasters, his having been divested (he also divested himself) of all other positions which might have shored up his Triborough power—despite all that, "What was necessary to remove Moses from power was a unique, singular concatenation of circumstances: that the Governor of New York be the one man uniquely beyond the reach of normal political influences, and that the trustee for Triborough's bonds be a bank run by the Governor's brother."

In case my enthusiasm for this magnificent biography has not shone through clearly enough, let me conclude by saying that it is, in my judgment, the most important work ever written on American state and local politics. In its dissection and analysis of the elements of political power in our system it stands alone. For any historian or political scientist not utterly stupefied by "methodology" it ought to exert a truly redemptive effect, leading them at last out of the Mandarin desert. (I say "ought to" but without any great confidence: what Robert Caro did in this book is *hard work*—ever so much harder than diddling a computer and then pasting up the results for a journal article.)

In Caro's masterful hands the record of Robert Moses' accumulation of power makes hypnotic reading for anyone with even the slightest interest in politics. The story of his transformation from lyric poet and good government idealist to the most ruthless corrupter of the political process in New York's history will be just as fascinating to anyone with even the slightest interest in human motivation. At several points throughout the book Caro lays aside the chronological narrative to talk about the Moses *persona*—his lifestyle, relations with family and associates, romantic attachments, tastes and distastes. The portrait that emerges has the kind of uncanny realism of a Velasquez; and perhaps only an ideologue could finally decide that the subject is more hateful than admirable, or vice versa. The rest of us are likely only to be shaken—and deeply grateful to a great portraitist. Read it—read it and weep. □

Book Review/Christopher Buckley

He Made America Laugh

Shakespeare was sublime, but George Kaufman was prolific. Beyond belief. He wrote 75 plays in collaboration with 22 other dramatists, including three early Marx Brothers comedies, *Cocoanuts*, *Animal Crackers*, and *A Night at the Opera*. He directed 46 plays, and some 48 films have been made from his productions. He also managed to write 59 major humor pieces for the *Nation*, the *Saturday Review*, and the *New Yorker*. This figure does not include, of course, the thousands of reviews he did as a staffer for the *New York Times*, where he worked as drama editor, resigning in 1930. The two major kudos came when he won Pulitzer Prizes, the first for *Of Thee I Sing*, written with Morrie Ryskind, and the second for *The Man Who Came to Dinner*, a Moss Hart collaboration. Kaufman wrote his first play when he was 14, and was working on one when he died in 1961 at the age of 72.

This skeletal diagram of his opus begs the question, Did success spoil George Kaufman? Author Meredith, in his behemoth, 652-page-cum-appendixes biography has written a masterful encyclopedia of Kaufman's world. *GSKAHF* brims over with anecdotage, a compendium of tales drawn from the lives of myriad playwrights, composers, journalists, editors, actors, wits, and wags who made up New York's smart set when, as the book jacket tells us, "Broadway *was* the Great White Way."

Meredith's research is flawless. His labor of love has a bibliography of 320 books and ten thousand clippings. He interviewed and corresponded with scores of people who knew Kaufman and worked with him. When he died, Groucho Marx came up with the condign epitaph, "He made America laugh for over forty years." The trouble with the book is that while Meredith often induces us to smile, he seldom makes us laugh.

Which is a result of flabby prose and overscrupulous attention to minutiae. It is not the fault of the subjects, many of whose Algonquin Round Table aphorisms still surface today in well-heeled cocktail parties. There is Robert Benchley's "I'd like to get out of this wet suit and into a dry martini," Dorothy Parker's "If all the girls at Smith and Bennington were laid end to end, I wouldn't be surprised," and hundreds of *mano à mano*'s. Marc Connelly, who was both very bald and Kaufman's first collaborator, was sitting in a restaurant when a friend came up and rubbed his hand over Connelly's bare skull, saying, "This feels just like my wife's behind." "I'll be damned," quipped Connelly, "so it does."

The book is amply punctuated with such chestnuts. What flows inbetween is, giggle-wise, less satisfying. But the author is always informative, occasionally to the point of maddening irrelevance. He has created not so much an engaging narrative, but as an enormously successful reference book. For anyone who has wondered how the *New Yorker* got its name, or who was really responsible for the *Citizen Kane* screenplay, or even about Harpo Marx's *Weltanschauung*, it provides answers.

As for Kaufman, he wanders through the pages like a benign spider, spinning a web. He didn't ensnare, though. He attracted. And it was quite a gathering of butterflies: Dorothy Parker, Ring Lardner, Alexander Woollcott, George and Ira Gershwin, Herbert Bayard Swope, Heywood Broun, Moss Hart, Harold Ross,

George S. Kaufman and His Friends

by Scott Meredith
Doubleday $12.95

Cole Porter, James Thurber, John Steinbeck... everybody who, the book jacket might as well have said, *was* somebody when Broadway *was* the Great White Way.

America first started to laugh when *Dulcy*, a Kaufman-Connelly collaboration, appeared in 1921. In the years of success that followed, he was called every name, from "a cheap play doctor" to "genius."

When it came to sharing his success with his collaborators, he was self-effacing to the point of selflessness. When *Once in a Lifetime*, which he wrote with a young nobody, opened in 1930 and the audience raved, Kaufman walked out on stage after the final curtain and announced to the crowd, "I want you to know this play is eighty percent Moss Hart." And it was Kaufman who did all the worrying for his collaborators. He threw himself into gothic fits of gloom before an opening, even if everyone else connected with the play, including the ever-vigilant producer, was sure of success.

This was no neurotic pessimism, however. Though Kaufman devoted his life to making America laugh, he had a keen grasp of tragedy. "How many people," he once said to Connelly, the sanguine optimist of the pair, "really hope for your success on opening night? A failure is somehow more satisfying all around." He was no one's fool. Success never spoiled George Kaufman.

He was charismatic in an age when charisma was undefined and the Camelot gang were attending English public schools. He was never one of the "beautiful people," at least according to Irwin Shaw, who described him physically: "Like a small schooner built in a local New England shipyard by a boatwright with noble intentions but rough tools... and in action like the same craft with a few tattered sails flying in a force eight wind."

Of his personal life, we find that Kaufman's karma was coated not with glitter, but with trauma and phobias. His wife, Beatrice, was unable to have intercourse with him, having gone through agonizing labor pains which produced a stillborn child; their marital relationship was a real life parallel to Leopold and Molly Bloom's. He was a hypochondriac, had phobias about touching people, flying, germs; he pathologically loathed waiters and cabdrivers; he was a "cantankerous croquet player" and a demanding bridge partner. Socially, he was a combination of Calvin Coolidge and Groucho Marx: he spoke when he had something stunningly funny to say, and that meant he often only spoke three times during a party. And, finally, in an era when so many of the Great White Way people were dashing off to Hollywood, or the south of France to lunch with Somerset Maugham and dine with George Bernard Shaw, he was always provincial. "I never want to be anyplace," he once told a friend, "where I can't be back in Times Square in thirty minutes."

Kaufman seldom did venture further than Times Square. His friends were usually close by, either at the Round Table luncheons, or at the gang's regular poker games, which they called "regular meetings of the Thanatopsis Literary and Inside Straight Club." (Thanatopsis means contemplation of death.) The stars of these New York gatherings were the best at describing themselves and their friends.

Alexander Woollcott was particularly deft at witty, back-stabbing-but-always-in-the-spirit-of-fun caricature. Dorothy Parker, he once said, was "a mixture of Little Nell and Lady Macbeth," while another member of the Round Table, Harold Ross, "looked like a dishonest Abe Lincoln." When it came to describing Kaufman, there was plenty of wit, but never any backstabbing. There was never any need to lay him low, even in jest. Groucho Marx, who made his name for himself with Kaufman scripts, said that his "notion of an ideal date was a girl who looked like Marilyn Monroe and talked like George Kaufman."

There, in a way, you have it all. Meredith tells us a great deal. But, alas, in the presence of so much detail, the greatness of a man like Kaufman fades in puddles of trivia, no matter how funny. My own notion of an ideal biography of the *primus mobile* of the Great White Way would be a book researched by Scott Meredith and written by George S. Kaufman. □

Stripping Bare Her Bachelors

Someone once remarked to me that every teenager believes he is the first person since the beginning of the world to have known about sex. Only such a belief enables the newly-experienced to escape the repulsive realization that survivors of similar ecstasies have turned into the stodgy dullards he recognizes as his parents.

The pride occasioned by their ingenious invention may, as my informant suggested, suffuse all young people at all times and in all places, but I would claim for the present generation of Americans a unique distinction in the field of sexual discovery. Led by many who demand high rank for themselves as social theorists, our living countrymen are the first to believe that they, as a whole and collectively, discovered sex. As evidence of the persuasiveness of this belief, let me point to an undeniable fact: ours is the first generation to pride itself on welding sex to egalitarianism. I am not referring now merely to a demand for "equal rights" for women, whatever that may mean. I am talking rather of the demand that all persons be allowed equally to enjoy sexual experience on whatever terms they may prefer, and that government—the establisher of equality—must protect and advance the cause of sexual equality with the same zeal with which it is charged to establish and defend equality in other spheres.

To be plain about it, this novel doctrine puts free sex on the same ethical plane as free speech, and its supporters, including a number of our most popular writers of sex manuals, urge that free sex should be defended like free speech because of its contribution to individual enhancement and social progress. By free sex, they mean such practices as so-called open marriage, involving consensual and other nonexclusive extramarital couplings; legalized abortion and contraceptives, which open the avenues of comfort and ease to the unwed; simple divorce; and the wide acceptance of the belief that each person's body and sex habits are His or Her Own business, exclusively. Gilder's book deals with their consequences.

The factual basis on which the benefits of free sex are established is, to put it mildly, rather sketchy. The Thomas Paines of sex depend on the theoretical assertion that the release of sexual repression benefits the soul, and that free sex releases repression. It is therefore fitting and proper that Gilder, for one, should assert a contrary case, marshalling some facts and much conjecture and wit to suggest that free sex is in fact exceedingly expensive. The "sexual revolution," he argues, can be liberating for some people, particularly those men who, for reasons often connected with power and wealth, are most attractive sexually. But for large numbers of others, the new morality has brought not release but new, and perhaps deeper, frustrations. Single and divorced men have fewer women to choose from as mates, because the sexually powerful among their sex dominate female attentions. Likewise older women whose husbands take the cue from emerging mores and leave their wives for younger, more attractive bedmates, have nowhere to turn.

Gilder is particularly concerned about the psychological impact of free sex on single men, which he believes has disastrous effects for society. Indeed, it is to this psychological impact that he attributes much of the increase in crime in recent years, and the rising incidence of homosexuality and impotence. He puts forth a panoply of statistics, showing, e.g., that single men are more likely to be unemployed than married men; that they are five times as likely to be convicted of rape; and that they are more prone to disease, insanity, and all forms of criminality. "One way to explain black poverty," according to Gilder, "is to point out that 39 percent of black men are single, compared to 27 percent of whites." Single men, in his view, are society's chief menace: they are frustrated, disoriented, and potentially violent.

Naked Nomads

by George Gilder
Quadrangle $7.95

Gilder further argues that the new welding of sex and egalitarianism actually has very inegalitarian and hierarchical implications. "Monogamy," he writes, "is egalitarianism in the realm of love. It is a mode of rationing. It means one to a customer." Both women and men are integrated into the social pattern, and hardly anyone loses out. But when monogamy breaks down, then many—particularly single men and older women—*do* lose out. It is no accident, he points out, that polygamous societies—such as the Islamic world—have the most hierarchical distributions of power and wealth.

Now the remarkable feature of Gilder's short book is not that it is particularly well written or that it is persuasive to the unpersuaded, but that it should have had to be written at all. His major argument is that free sex requires men and women to be freed from the bonds of monogamy, and that such freedom actually tends to destroy men, with disastrous results for society as a whole. Once Gilder has cleverly stated this proposition, it seems to me self-evident. But its repetition, on which Gilder founds his rhetorical method, must strike my benighted countrymen as perverse, outdated, or cranky.

I say this despite my suspicion that most of those who mouth great paeans to liberation or libertinism do not really disagree with Gilder's basic view that monogamous marriage is essential to social stability and to most human achievement. Or at least (even in those modern urban circles where it is unfashionable to say so) most people still believe that monogamy works better than any other sexual order that has yet been devised, a statement covering a large sweep of history and geography. Thus, for all their panting for the virtues of free sex and open marriage, the advocates of free sex remain remarkably silent when new towns, new settlements, and new housing developments emerge, basing their physical arrangements on the expectation that monogamy works best.

We might indicate the trend of such planning, and the reasons for it, by noting the new American frontier that is taking shape in a way that should provoke cries of anguish from the sexual liberationists, but doesn't. I am referring to those settlements in northern Canada and Alaska which are cut off from highway access to the main body of Americans as rudely as were Dodge City and Tombstone. In new towns, deliberately designed and carefully planned by sociologically trained architects and engineers, forces of workers are mining and shipping ores under climatic conditions as extreme as those of Siberia. Other large forces of men are constructing mammoth hydroelectric projects in the wilderness of the Labrador back country.

Although these tasks remain crude, rough work, they are now largely mechanized, with a capital investment per worker vastly higher than that provided in the frontier mining towns of the nineteenth century—and this investment has several implications. The mining investor of the 1890s suffered no great loss whenever a couple of the boys in the Malemute saloon plugged each other stone cold dead in a challenge over a whore whose last name neither knew. But it's a much more serious matter when a Labrador dragline operator with five million dollars in diesel electric equipment at his fingertips burns out a shaft bearing to demonstrate his machismo and his skill to the nearby crane operator who is his rival for the hand of some peripatetic prostitute. Better he should spend the night arguing with his wife over a bad four-spade bid, than spend it handwrestling his union brother in the saloon for the right to go upstairs first.

The town planners of the new North have recognized what Gilder has formu-

lated, and which I think most people only pretend not to accept. They—the planners—want no part of the new (and very old) sexuality. They perceive that the threat to male stability does not arise from sexual deprivation; that can be taken care of quite readily. The danger, rather, arises from the self-perpetuated immaturity of a settlement made up almost entirely of single men. The investors want to safeguard the money they have put into the acquisition of heavy, complex machinery, and the transport of that machinery, sometimes by air, to the remote North. To save that initial investment, the planners encourage them to make another investment. They insist on building houses suitable for family homes, shopping centers, schools, meeting rooms, and recreational centers. Monogamous domiciliary investment is far costlier than the installation of single men's barracks and a few two-story "saloons," but the added investment pays for itself, even over the limited fifteen-year life typical of some of these northern mining towns.

Is anyone prepared to argue the point? Or to claim that men in the North are basically different from men further south?

A second, highly suggestive way in which those who vocally disagree with Gilder's evaluation of the singles life betray their actual acceptance of his proposition arises in connection with sex in the religious life. There is no doubt in my mind that almost all advocates of free sex also advocate the alleged right, now being debated in Episcopalian circles, of women to perform the holy sacraments. I daresay that there is almost total overlap-



ping of those who believe that women should be allowed to become Episcopal priests and those who believe that Roman Catholic priests should be allowed to marry. Not having made an attitudinal survey, I have no data to support a second hypothesis, namely that these same people believe that priestly celibacy is not normal.

No group offers such concrete corroboration of Gilder's view of the social threat of singleness than those celibate urban priests who, having lost interest in the rituals and traditions of their church, devote their tremendous unrestrained energy to the accomplishment of social policy objectives. Every big city agency

Better a Labrador machinist should spend the night arguing with his wife over a four-spade bid, than wrestling his union brother in the saloon for the right to go upstairs first.

dealing with poverty and race has become familiar with them; a few have attained national celebrity.

Priests in sweaters are found in the front of tenant movements and movements for community control of schools and other municipal institutions. I do not mean to suggest that sweatered priests are the only white leaders who affiliate themselves with the causes of the poor and the nonwhite; nor are they the only religious leaders involved. Yet there is an interesting difference between the other religious leaders and the priests in street clothes, and between the religious social leaders and the political or community leaders. The uncloistered nuns who offer immediate, first-hand nursing and home care for sick poor families feel just as deeply as the priests, but stop far short of militant, politicized partisanship.

To meet and deal with one of these men is to meet a leader strikingly different from the natural members of the group seeking redress. The activist priest brings to his beliefs on social policy the same religious certainty that accompanies divine revelations. His assurance over values is accompanied by a personal intensity that may reflect the far side of repressed sexuality; or, where the sexuality is not in fact repressed, the explosion of feelings of guilt.

The unstable patterns of priestly behavior—which Gilder describes as characteristic of single men in general—are joined with two other painfully trying characteristics. First, the sweatered priest often leads a primarily unmarried band of followers in what seems a modern version of a tribal hunting party: the raid on public offices to demand concessions is followed by a presentation of symbolic trophies to the press, before an honor guard of spear carriers. To the official, who stands warily in the background and hears the "concession" which he was all too ready to give anyway described as though it had been wrung from his beleaguered body by superior force, this exercise seems less motivated to redress wrongs than to offer a proof of manhood. Second, the priestly leadership on a specific issue is likely to evaporate without warning, wheeling to pursue a wholly different social goal, in collaboration with another group, perhaps in another part of the city. Anyone who has had experience with these single men (charming, dedicated, and talented though many of them are) will share Gilder's misgivings about a social order, like a vastly expanded priesthood, in which monogamy is discouraged.

Regrettably, Gilder's book will probably fail to persuade people in 1975 that the problem of sex in society cannot be solved by the simple nostrum of Egalitarianism. Partly, of course, this is a product of the *Zeitgeist*. We live in a period in which all people are not only equal but interchangeable; yet we face a hierarchy of ideas in which the newest is necessarily best. It is, in these terms, "chauvinist" to suggest that there is some reason for the ancient habit of differentiating roles on the basis of sex; but it is not chauvinist to believe that a newly popular idea is better simply because it is new.

We cannot, however, ascribe all of the lack of persuasiveness in *Naked Nomads* to causes outside the book's jacket. The book itself, though quite small, is packed with repetition of what is after all a single apothegm, however brilliantly stated and clearly seen. Gilder bolsters his case of differentiation of the sexes by brief quotations from anthropological studies. One probably does better to read the original works, with their overwhelming data on the differentiation of sexual roles. This differentiation appears over and over again in widely separated cultures. It could be eradicated only by the political wielding of a cultural authoritarianism whose toll in human freedom remains uncounted by those who insist that sexual differences are "merely" physical.

When he runs out of pithy remarks and brief quotations, Gilder offers small fictional accounts, largely of unhappy and feckless single males. The accounts are intended to improve debater's points, but they are neither good fiction nor effective parable. One wonders, then, whether an effective literary case can be made for monogamy and against sexual freedom, or whether we partisans will fall back in the end on religious insights.

Perhaps, as a third possibility, one shouldn't bother to make a case for monogamy. The overwhelming majority of the population accepts it. The American people are not in fact following the lead of the radical feminists, and statistics seem to show that the sexual adventures of which we hear so much arise primarily among the relatively small group of the population to which the writers belong. Unfortunately, duodenal ulcers are likely to result from the attempt to ignore the pretentious bombast about wifely slavery, male chauvinist outrages, and the beauties of liberating men by assuring

them they they have no significant sexual role to play in the world. Besides, next year the sexual freedom fighters might do better.

But if they are to be answered, it cannot be by the inflation of an apothegm. To be persuasive, a contemporary argument for monogamy must measure both sides, not merely one; it must set the problems of marriage against the problems of singlehood. Gilder's bitter incrimination of the singles life is unilluminated by a discussion of marriage, and while I agree that society has an interest in marriage, it does not follow from the blues of bachelorhood that there is not grave difficulty in wedlock.

Unmarried himself, as he constantly reminds us he is, Gilder tends to romanticize the monogamous way of life. His arraignment of bachelorhood for men and for society is serious (although some of his fictional entries detract from the seriousness without adding to the wit), but Gilder has made no effort to examine why marriage appears defective to so many American women today, nor what they currently expect from it. While Gilder and I agree that monogamy is better for society, we live in an era when women want to know how much better, and at what cost to the picture they have been given of themselves. Even in the Canadian North, there's a limit to the investment anyone would make for the sake of monogamy, and a shrewd planner will stop short of advocating the capital investment that would be required to induce Gloria Steinem to settle down for the winter as the wife of a crane operator (we might do a little better with Germaine Greer).

Something of the same calculus has to be performed on American marriage away from the frontier. If Gilder wants women to demand that single men marry them, he will, I think, have to persuade them that men are at least slightly better than the useless sad-sacks he depicts They won't marry you because they feel sorry for you, George; not today; not the ones you want. They don't want to be the bearers of virtue, as Lynda Nochlin, a Vassar teacher, scornfully puts it. I think she's wrong; I think they're wrong; but this is what they think they believe. In the present mood of their spokespersons, women are insulted by the suggestion that they should be motivated by anything other than self-advancement. It is ironic that because Gilder hopes women will choose virtue, he is labeled by *Time* magazine the number one male chauvinist of our time. The fact that he portrays his sex as naked nomads and pitiful incompetents wins him no merit badges. They don't praise him for being a *humble* male chauvinist, even though I think he's altogether too humble. □

The Bootblack Stand

by George Washington Plunkitt

Dear Dr. Plunkitt:

On May 16 my boss, the Rt. Hon. Wilbur D. Mills, and many other legislators and members of the press corps received a copy of the following press release from your editor, a Mr. Tyrrell, Jr. I quote it in its rather odd entirety so that you will get the full flavor of your editor's recent activities and perhaps understand Mr. Mills' solicitude for Mr. Tyrrell, Jr.'s health. The press release read:

"*For Immediate Release*

"(Bloomington, Indiana)—Describing American immigration authorities' refusal to process three female employees of Annie's Saigon Bar as one of the "most blatant acts of male chauvinism and arrant bigotry displayed by America in many years," R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., editor-in-chief of *The Alternative* magazine of Bloomington, Indiana, announced today that he, the magazine's publisher, and the magazine's managing editor, intend to sponsor the three young women and to see to it that they are brought into the country with the rest of the South Vietnamese refugees.

"Tyrrell is asking for the support of all 'serious civil libertarians' in his attempt to bring the women to America.

" 'These are energetic working girls,' said Tyrrell. 'They have a venerable profession, and their record during America's participation in the war eloquently bespeaks their friendliness toward America and the American way of life.'

"Tyrrell is seeking the support of all concerned Americans and urges them to write their Congressmen and Senators on behalf of his petition. 'We would love to have these women in the office,' Tyrrell said. 'We are an equal opportunity employer. Those girls could go right to the top.' "

Mr. Mills wants to warn your colleague against the treachery of spirituous drink. If Mr. Tyrrell, Jr. has been overworking and would like to take a sabbatical to Bethesda Naval Hospital, Mr. Mills would be glad to use his good offices, not only at Bethesda but at any of the other numerous hospitals frequented by Congressmen in this area. Demon Rum can be a cruel master. Swear off the jug, Mr. Tyrrell, Jr. Sobriety is the only enduring high!

(P.S.: Senator Kennedy joins Mr. Mills in his concern.)

—Cordially,
Kenneth Turnipseed,
Press Secretary
to Wilbur D. Mills, M.C.

Dear Mr. Turnipseed:

There, there. You are taking an unduly negative position toward one of nature's most benign forces. Several years ago Mr. Tyrrell became attracted to the organic foods movement and then to various health foods. Since that time he has treated his body as though it were a precious vessel. He drinks only for his health, though I have often seen him make the educative gesture of drinking "to" the health of others. In fact it is a competence which he possesses in several different languages. More to the point, he is a scientific drinker, drinking only quality stuff rich in malts and various grains. The whiskeys he favors are laced with corn, and, for energy, sugar. Tyrrell's diet is not only an organic orgy, but it is mostly liquid and highly digestible. Personally I have never met an alcoholic who did not have wonderfully dilated arterials, a voluptuous blood flow, and superb laxation. Strong drink lightens the spirit and takes off the chill, so to speak. I suggest you give this matter some more thought, Mr. Turnipseed. You never heard of a St. Bernard rescue dog lugging a gallon of milk around its neck, did you?

—GWP

Mission Impossible

When C. Jackson Grayson, Jr. first reached the capitol to assume his duties as chairman of the Price Commission under Phase II, he was granted interviews with Paul McCracken and Herbert Stein of the Council of Economic Advisers. According to Grayson, their advice was: "Not much in classical economics seems to be working, why don't you come up with something on your own rather than be prejudiced by our views?" Isn't it astonishing that the chief official economists of the government would so casually wash their hands of responsibility for the most abrupt and radical shift in economic policy in the last twenty-five years—the imposition of wage and price controls? Is economic theory, classical or not, silent on the subject of controls? Or on inflation?

Only days before Nixon announced the wage and price control program in August 1971, Council chairman McCracken issued an eloquent statement *against* the adoption of such measures. I infer that the members of the Council likely opposed the control program and surely understood the impossibility of administering it without inefficiencies, disruptions, inequities, and the loss of personal freedom. Hence to avoid association with and responsibility for the certain results, McCracken and Stein opted to leave Grayson and his colleagues on their own to conjure up some treatment for the symptoms, rather than the causes, of inflation.

The preface to *Confessions* reads: "There is no analysis [in the book] of whether inflation was caused by excessive money supply, fiscal irresponsibility, business and labor power, devaluation, new social contracts, or a combination of these factors." True to its promise, the book does not contain such a discussion, perhaps because the Commission never had the inclination or the time to develop such an analysis. If it seems peculiar that the economists on the Commission did not persuade their colleagues to direct their efforts to the causes rather than the results of inflation, remember that, by design, the Commission had absolutely no control over those policy variables that could with appropriate manipulation end the inflation. When faced with the alternatives of carrying on the charade of "fighting inflation with price controls" versus rejecting the appointment because the charge was silly, illogical, and preordained to failure, which would you choose?

Now to the heart of the matter. Inflation, by definition, is a persistent increase in the prices of goods and services. The rate of change in prices, while always positive in an inflation, may fluctuate widely—five percent this year, ten the next, and who knows what after that? The uncertainty associated with inflation is perhaps more serious than is the warping influence of an anticipated, steady rate of increase of prices.

Since prices of particular commodities change relative to one another as tastes and technology change, we reserve the term inflation for persistent increases in the general price indices—the consumer and the wholesale price indices. One-time increases in particular prices, like last year's hike in petroleum prices, are not usefully categorized as inflation. These are largely one-shot affairs where relative prices change and the general price indices move to a higher level after the system has completed its adjustment; once the force of the initial shock is spent, the general price level should not continue to rise.

Confessions of a Price Controller

by C. Jackson Grayson, Jr.
with Louis Neeb
Dow Jones Irwin $9.95

In this context, I know of no sound analysis that could attribute the cause of inflation to "structural blocks, business and labor power, or devaluation" unless these "causes" were themselves in perpetual, unidirectional change. Although the government finds it politically convenient to blame business and labor for inflation, there is no theoretical basis for this argument unless the power of the two groups is continually increasing. And there is no empirical evidence that this has been the case.

To be more specific, if a firm acquires additional "monopoly power," it can raise its prices to capture the newly available monopoly profits. But what does it do for an encore? When next year rolls around the firm finds that it is already pricing for maximum profit. Any further increase in prices will lead to reduced sales and profit.

Inflations are inextricably linked to changes in the money supply. If the government's desire to spend exceeds its willingness to tax, it will borrow to finance its deficit by selling bonds. But in order to sell increasing amounts of short-term maturities, the government must accept a deeper discount on the bonds and, consequently, short-term interest rates rise. Higher short-term rates lead to higher long-term rates which, in turn, reduce investment, production, and consumption, and increase unemployment; and the monetary authority, fearing this prospect, will force interest rates back down (or prevent them from rising initially) by increasing the money supply at a rate greater than that consistent with the current level of transactions of goods and services at constant prices. The "cost-push" variation on this theme is really no different; wherever the impetus for wage and price increases comes from, they must be validated by an increase in the money supply.

Given that deliberate action by the monetary authority is a necessary condition for perpetuating (and terminating) an inflation, the Price Commission's preoccupation with *ad hoc* measures is not surprising. Grayson's account of the planning, organization, and day-to-day operations dramatizes their concern with the symptoms rather than the causes of inflation. The only flaw in his presentation is that it contains few examples of the numerous shortages that appeared, no discussion of the "new products" artificially created, and no treatment of the effect the controls had on emerging firms and on the introduction of genuinely new products. However, there is sufficient narrative to convince the reader that the Price Commission did not base its policies and directives on economic models or econometric studies: "At the Price Commission we operated—I think fairly successfully—without getting the data we 'should' have had, without using any explicit decision tools, without formally consulting a management scientist, and without building models of our decision process." Instead, the emphasis was on "action, speed, good sense, equity, energy, intelligence, dedication to excellent results, and a clear sense of the importance of the mission." Professor Grayson offered the opinion that his task was not unlike an episode from *Mission Impossible*.

How well did the Commission carry out its mission? Let's look at food prices, for they affected everyone and consequently generated the most attention and criticism by the public. Early in the Commission's experience "the lettuce crop in California had suffered from bad weather, and prices ballooned to 40 cents, 50 cents, even 69 cents a head in some parts of the country." It doesn't take an economic expert to predict that if the Price Commission had frozen the price of lettuce at 25 cents a head, the product would have disappeared from grocery produce shelves. But when the Food Price Index rose at a lower rate (from a 1.8% increase in February down to a 0.2% increase in March), Commissioner Grayson was elated and celebrated with several martinis. In a press release he stated: "It is much too early to claim a victory over inflation. I do not. Price indicators will continue to fluctuate up and down, but I feel that the March indicators

are encouraging and offer a hopeful sign that we are moving toward our goal."

By the middle of June the Food Price Indicators were moving up again. A staff report stated: "The price of ready-to-slaughter cattle has surpassed the February 1971 level and has now reached a 21-year high." Similar reports were made for pork, fruits, and vegetables and "predictions were that prices would continue near present levels, or even go higher." Whether the Commission attributed the price changes to random events or whether they realized that the movements were caused by market forces, the futility of their control techniques is illustrated by the following passage from their open letter to the Cost of Living Council late in June: "While the [food price] problem has been caused by the natural forces of supply and demand, the Commission feels that immediate action must be taken to prevent further price increases. We, therefore, are recommending that the Cost of Living Council place raw agricultural products under control so that the Commission may adopt measures to control food prices at each level of the production and distribution process. It is also recommended that appropriate action be taken by the Council to alleviate the shortage of supply."

In other words, the Commission's price controls were ineffective in the face of market supply and demand forces. The last sentence of the paragraph is instructive; it demonstrates clearly that even the commissioners realized that price controls were impotent in the absence of additional controls over output and, by implication, inputs as well. The euphemism "appropriate action" can only mean command economy methods wherein all resources are directed to various uses by fiat of the government bureaucracy. Fortunately, such "appropriate action" was neither authorized nor taken.

Even the most ardent advocates of central direction of resource allocation admit that their schemes would require enormous amounts of information and data as well as sophisticated models and decision making criteria. The Price Commission, by its own admission, was not in possession of such intelligence and techniques. When the commissioners did consult with professionals they apparently received advice consistent with their casual approach to the problem: "I gathered about ten economists from Harvard College and the Harvard Business School, and their advice was to crack down harder on profits—not necessarily because they wanted to hurt business, but because they felt it was essential to keep public support, to hold labor to their 5.5 percent, and to hold down prices. 'Spill a little capitalist blood,' one recommended." I wonder what advice Grayson would have received from Harvard economists who *do* want to hurt business?

Grayson's Chapter 11 contains his assessment of the general impact of price controls and his worried projections for the future of a free society with such controls. He is not optimistic. He has first-hand knowledge and experience of the effects of controls and a clear memory of the popular clamor for them. His unqualified arguments against controls would have been more forceful had he supported them with specific cases. Instead, most of the book dwells on day-to-day mechanics, the pull and tug among the various agencies and commissions, and the personalities involved. However, some of the material is revealing; for example, the Commission decided at the outset that "Votes would not be taken until it was clear that we could not find a consensus position." Since many, if not most, of the issues debated by the Price Commission were issues of principle requiring a yes or no rather than a compromise decision, it's difficult to imagine an alternative procedure that would lead to a lower-quality common denominator in decision making. But then again, Grayson says the book is an account of "what happened when an 'economic jury' [the Price Commission] got together—a lawyer, an accountant, two economists, a business school dean, a businessman, a politician—and substituted their collective judgment for that of the marketplace." □

Book Review/Daniel Oliver

The 59 Percent Solution

William A. Rusher's compelling new book, even if it is 179 degrees off course, will do great service for the conservative cause by forcing politicians to worry about conservative voters. Close your eyes, get a friend to read from it, and you will have no doubt that this is the conservative advocate arguing, trenchantly as usual, that (a) the Republican Party not just is, but will continue to be, ineffective in bringing to pass conservative policies and (b) that a new party would be more likely to accomplish the conservatives' goals.

Mr. Rusher begins his argument by giving us a historical background of the two-party system and taking us on a guided tour through that system from Roosevelt up through Ford's selection of Rockefeller. Then he posits four requirements for replacing a major party: (1) A basic issue (like slavery in 1856) that divides at least the party to be replaced and probably the other one as well; (2) a "fresh impulse" reflecting a firm viewpoint on that issue; (3) a "counter-tendency" among some members of the party to be replaced causing them to seek happiness in the other party; and (4) "a strikingly weak leadership and organizational structure in the party to be replaced."

The Making of the New Majority Party

by William A. Rusher
Sheed and Ward $6.95

It is no secret, Rusher shows, that the Republican Party appears moribund. It gets only a courtesy rating in the polls. And clearly some nominal members of the Republican Party (e.g., Javits) would be happier if they were to follow some of their erstwhile party colleagues (Lindsay, Reid) into the Democratic Party.

But it is the "basic issue" that is key and, in a thesis he shares with Jeffrey Hart and Kevin Phillips, Rusher says that that issue is the division of the country into two groups, producers and nonproducers, with the country, of the producers so to speak, being run by the nonproducers for the nonproducers. The verbalists (bureaucrats, academics, the media and foundation types) collect the taxes from the producers (blue collar, white collar, salaried, entrepreneurs), skim off their own salaries, and pass on the balance to a huge welfarist constituency. The producers also share noneconomic beliefs in opposition to the nonproducers: they believe in a strong defense, a moral atmosphere (e.g., prayer in schools, no pornography) with at least the blessing of government, the absence of such social tinkering as busing, etc.

The coalition of interests—Rusher calls it the Great Coalition—is all-important. For Rusher identifies the traditional economic conservatives and the Wallace "social" conservatives as a single group, capable, the argument goes, of being persuaded to vote together. In a recent poll, 59% of the voters described themselves as, in some sense, conservative, but—and the future, very likely, of the conservative cause and the fate of the nation hang in the balance—whether they will

all march under the same banner remains to be seen.

Rusher's main problem is to keep the reader's mind on the argument in his book and off the newspapers, because Rusher must convince him that a new party is a necessity and not allow President Ford to persuade him that it is not—the burden of which task is made heavier by the Presidential focus of our politics and the conservative nature of our President. Mr. Ford, for whatever reason, has not been idle in making his case. Senator Barry Goldwater, for example, has been all but sewn up in the Ford camp. And on a more substantive level, Ford, after signing a horrendous tax cut bill, seems determined to veto future spending legislation. The Administration has announced its intention to control the regulatory agencies (freeing up the railroad, trucking, and airline industries); Ford tried to reform social spending (his attempt to cut food stamps and social security increases was blocked by Congress); and he actually kept the market economy a bit freer (he vetoed farm price support legislation). His handling of the *Mayaguez* affair was vintage gunboat diplomacy. And he has, perhaps not incidentally, two of the most conservative economic advisers in Washington that a free-market conservative could desire.

All of these, as I say, are things it would be wise for Mr. Rusher to keep the readers' mind off of. Instead he lists some of Ford's unacceptable actions, preeminent among which is his choosing Nelson Rockefeller to be Vice President. But by discussing some of Ford's acts, Rusher invites the reader to think of others (many of which will have occurred after he wrote), and the others are not—one must be honest—all that bad.

And that is certainly a paradox: at the very moment the formation of a new party seems to be a real possibility for conservatives, the occupant of the White House is the most conservative President we have had since—well, since the important issues of the day became the important issues. Is there, one might ask, anything Mr. Ford could do that would obviate the need for a new party? Mr. Rusher's answer, presumably, is no.

I confess that one of Rusher's own criteria bothers me—doubly so because he set them up and could be expected to knock them down so that they all pointed toward a new party. What is the fresh conservative impulse he speaks of? It has, he says, "been struggling for effective political expression in America for nearly twenty years." In which case—and I do not mean to cavil on single words—it is hardly fresh. Valid, very likely, but not fresh. Is it a fresh *voice* he has in mind?

Gerald Ford may be able to express that impulse as well as anyone but that is inadequate for Mr. Rusher. It is inadequate, I believe, because the real problem lies primarily in Congress—and must be solved there. It is Congress, clearly, that is out of step with the American people: for example, the consumer protection legislation now being considered by the people's representatives in Congress is opposed by 81% of the people.

How then do you change Congress? By forming, perhaps, a new major party, with a leader who sets the national debate, and constructs, perhaps even with many of the very same old politicians (but with new ones where necessary), a political institution, with new loyalties and new commitments, a process that sheds the name Republican, and along with it not just the onus of Watergate but also the accumulated anti-Republican sentiment which is as much the product of clubhouse spirit and family ties as of rational opposition to no longer lively issues.

Surely it is not foreordained that the makeup of Congress forever conflict with statistically indicated demographic truths. Nonetheless, some say "it" won't work, by which they mean that the political process (in this case, trying to form a new vehicle for carrying the majority's interests) is bound to fail us—a devastating critique of democracy. To them the proper reply is that "it" isn't working now. Put otherwise, in trying to form a new party conservatives have little to lose—though victory, I suspect, is farther off than most conservatives understand current third-party talk and Mr. Rusher's book to indicate. Mr. Rusher says the conservative case will never be properly advocated—enthusiastically, dependably—within the Republican Party, and after years of working, watching, and hoping, Mr. Rusher can wait no longer. ☐



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The Corruption of the Public Spirit

The aims of *A Discourse on Statesmanship* are threefold, according to the author: first, "to generate a new school of statesmanship"; second, to facilitate "a synthesis of classical and modern political science"; and third, "to advance a new interpretation of American history." The book is divided into two parts. Part I is an account of "the politics of magnanimity" as practiced by the American Founding Fathers, whom Eidelberg presents as models of the statesmanly art. Part II describes the way in which the American polity has been transformed from the Founders' plan, under the influence of Woodrow Wilson's "revolutionary rhetoric"; and the corresponding decline in the theory and practice of statesmanship as a result of economic and intellectual "laissez faire" and "religious indifferentism."

The specific intention of Part I of the *Discourse* is to demonstrate that the American regime as originally conceived corresponded to the requirements that Aristotle lays down for the best generally practicable regime, the "polity" or mixed government. While Eidelberg is strongly critical of Charles Beard's view that the Constitution was an oligarchic document designed to advance the economic interests of the few, the main thrust of his argument is directed against Martin Diamond's contention that the American regime was from the outset essentially democratic, and against the claim of the "Straussian school" (in which Diamond is numbered) that the Founding Fathers "lowered the ends" of political life in accordance with the teachings of John Locke.

Drawing extensively on *The Federalist* as well as on other writings of the Founders, Eidelberg, who is Research Professor of Political Science at the University of Dallas, mounts a powerful case against the purely democratic interpretation of the Constitution. He is less successful, however, in establishing that the American regime can adequately be understood as an Aristotelian "polity," and in attempting to refute the view that the Founders lowered the goal of political life as compared with the teachings of the premodern classical and Christian thinkers.

Eidelberg appears to give insufficient weight to two features of the Constitution, and of the Founders' exposition of its principles, that differentiate it from Aristotle's account of the polity. In the first place, the Founders explicitly aimed, in adopting a written constitution, to *limit the scope* of government. However broadly one may interpret the powers granted to the three branches, it is clear from the Constitution and *The Federalist* that the Founders understood the legitimate *purposes* of government to be primarily the maintenance of domestic order, security against foreign nations, and the promotion of commercial prosperity. To be sure, as Eidelberg notes, Aristotle did not expect a "polity," *in practice,* to secure much more for the mass of its citizens than the satisfaction of these basic bodily needs. But the scope of the government described by Aristotle includes the maintenance of a civil religion and the regulation of the citizens' lives in innumerable ways that are clearly prohibited under the American Constitution. The very *principle* of "limited government," as propagated by the Founders, is likely to have an important influence in shaping the views of the citizens who live under it concerning the *goals* of the common life. This principle implies, in accordance with the teaching of Locke, that government exists to satisfy the selfish desires of individuals, rather than that the individual (as Aristotle asserts) exists for the sake of the community.

A Discourse on Statesmanship: The Design and Transformation of the American Polity

by Paul Eidelberg
University of Illinois $16.00

While admitting that *The Federalist* emphasizes "the passions of self-interest" to a degree unparalleled in Aristotle's *Politics*, Eidelberg notes that Aristotle did provide a comparable discussion of these passions in his *Rhetoric*, and suggests that *The Federalist*, as a work of political rhetoric, ought rather to be judged against the latter work. But this argument fails to take account of the fact that *The Federalist* is a public exposition of the principles of a particular regime, rather than merely a practical manual for statesmen and orators. While all statesmen have made use of men's self-interested passions, *The Federalist* gives these passions a public *respectability* and suggests that their channeling through the right kind of institutions can greatly reduce the need for virtue in both statesmen and citizens. Eidelberg's failure to give adequate consideration to the public effects of the Founders' teaching, on which the Constitution was based, constitutes a second defect in his quasi-Aristotelian interpretation of that document. This defect also weakens the otherwise provocative and insightful interpretation that Eidelberg sets forth of the "transformation of the American polity," in Part II of *A Discourse on Statesmanship*.

Eidelberg contends that Woodrow Wilson, more than any other of our statesmen, was responsible for the alteration of the American "polity" into a democracy. He supports this contention with a trenchant analysis of Wilson's writings, beginning with his student years, that reveals the remarkable extent to which Wilson pursued a consistent political "strategy" throughout his lifetime, aimed at transforming the government from an impartial protector of men's equal *rights* to the engine by which their economic and social *condition* might be equalized. By replacing the Founders' "politics of magnanimity" with a "politics of compassion," Eidelberg argues, Wilson corrupted the character of the American public, encouraging a spirit of envy and selfishness instead of industry and public-spiritedness. This corruption has subsequently been increased by other intellectual developments, notably the propagation of "religious indifferentism" and moral relativism, in the twentieth century. The only remedy for our condition, Eidelberg believes, is the resurgence of a statesmanship rivaling that of the Founders. Such a statesmanship would not merely resurrect the practices and institutions of the past, however, but would contribute to its "redemption in novel arrangements" based on a synthesis of the classical and modern teachings.

Interesting as is Eidelberg's analysis of the causes of the American polity's "decay," it is weakened, I have suggested, by the author's exaggeration of the "Aristotelian" character of the Constitution itself. Eidelberg presents Wilson's rhetoric, and the subsequent decline in the theory and practice of American politics, as an abrupt break with the Founders' political teaching and intention; he does not sufficiently consider what elements in the original structure of the regime may have made this decay possible. Was not the era of rampant economic laissez faire, to which Eidelberg presents Wilson's teaching as an over-reaction, facilitated by the Founders' own emphasis on the promotion of commerce? Granted that the original Constitution was not simply democratic, did it not place the balance of political power in the hands of the majority, and hence make inevitable over the long run the further democratization of the regime? And (as Eidelberg partly concedes), must not the principle of absolute religious toleration ultimately soften men's religious attachments, thus contributing to "religious indifferentism" and further unleashing the pursuit of narrow self-interest?

Whatever the causes of the decay of American statesmanship, we may agree that Eidelberg has identified a central

problem of our times, to which few political scientists have devoted attention. Less intelligible than this practical intention of Eidelberg's, however, is his theoretical project of bringing about a "synthesis" of ancient and modern political science. Eidelberg's scattered account of this synthesis is too hazy to constitute a demonstration that it is either necessary or possible. It is difficult to determine the meaning of statements like Eidelberg's remark that "[t]he measure of the individual is the intensity of his relevance for his society," and to recognize in them an improvement over, say, Aristotle's political science. There may indeed be critical difficulties in the classical as well as the modern views of politics; but Eidelberg never works out his own doctrine of "nonfinalistic teleology" sufficiently to show that it represents a superior or even a meaningful alternative.

A Discourse on Statesmanship is a thoughtful and thought-provoking work of scholarship, well worth the attention of all serious students of politics, philosophy, and history. Aside from the difficulties in Eidelberg's argument that I have mentioned, however, the book is marred by a doctrinaire and unnecessarily contentious tone (in one of the author's frequent asides, for instance, we are suddenly informed that "[i]ncidentally, the superabundance of sentimentalism and moral purism in contemporary political oratory is symptomatic of an effeminate age wavering between adolescence and senility"). Eidelberg is also occasionally careless with respect to details (John Rawls' "original position" is mislabeled the "ordinary position"). Had he moderated his passion and limited his rather grandiose aims, Eidelberg might have written an even better book. □

EMINENTOES
(continued from page 2)

the subject of one of Mrs. Fenwick's major foreign policy addresses. In a House speech she reviewed the history of this short-lived republic, concluding starkly: "In 1940, Russia occupied Lithuania, held a phony election, and incorporated Lithuania into the USSR. Since then, Mr. Speaker, we have heard little from Lithuania. Soviet control has been complete over news and emigration."

Mrs. Fenwick did not have time to embellish her speech with detail, but the transfer of power in Lithuania was an orderly one. The Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact was signed on August 23, 1939, and in October the Red Army garrisoned several Lithuanian localities. Russia occupied Lithuania on June 15, 1940, conducted rigged elections in July, and the next month incorporated it into the Soviet Union. On the night of June 14, 1941, 30,455 members of the Lithuanian intelligentsia (i.e. the whole intelligentsia) were rounded up and sent to Siberia. There were more than five thousand political executions, and an overall disappearance of 45,000 thousand Lithuanians from their homeland.

That month the Nazis invaded, exterminating the country's Jewish population over the next three years. In July 1944, power was transferred back to the Soviet Union, whose army slaughtered much of the native population, this time without keeping a count. Within that year eighty thousand Lithuanians managed to reach the West; sixty thousand others were sent to Siberia.

The Soviet Union had clearly become Lithuania's basic reality. Yet during the 1945-53 period tens of thousands of young Lithuanians were reported to be hiding in the country's forests. This was a flight from reality. But the Lithuanian mind was clouded by superstition—the nation's majority then being devoutly Roman Catholic (there were exceptions—an embryonic Libertarian movement). In 1947 more than a thousand of the country's 1,332 surviving priests were sent to Russia, where apparently it was felt they could be of greater use. In 1945-46, 145,000 Lithuanians were removed from their homeland, and in 1949 another 60,000 of them were taken to Siberia and northern Russia. These are observable violations of personal freedom.

The long suffering of the Lithuanians, however, might be nearing an end. "I have no doubt," Mrs. Fenwick told the House, "that they will again one day achieve self-government. This should be one of the goals of our discussions of detente with the Soviet Union."

Mrs. Fenwick's study of the basic international realities during her first months in office led her to the view that America's defense posture must be at once responsible *and* sane. "We must have a solid capacity for defense," she wrote. "We must have a clear foreign policy, soundly based on public debate and consensus, about our responsibilities." Such a consensus is beginning to emerge, particularly in regard to Chicago.

Chicago is the largest urban center in the state of Illinois, which is somewhere in the Midwest. The hypothetical ques-

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tion people in Washington are asking is—does the United States have a legal or moral commitment to defend Chicago? Legally, the answer is no. Chicago is not a signatory to either the SEATO or NATO treaties. But, morally, America has an immense commitment. Of course, we learned in Vietnam that the U.S. must never again commit ground troops in a ground war. However, there is no reason American air power couldn't be mobilized over the city to drop leaflets explaining the advantages of the American way of life. Before anything is done, though, Mayor Daley would have to resign so that free elections could be held. The newly elected municipal government would then resign so that a more broadly based coalition could be formed, including all elements. Then free elections could be held.

Should the citizens of Chicago demonstrate a sincere commitment to democratic government, the way would be open for extensive U.S. military aid, for a limited period of time. But the United States would not lose prestige if foreign troops were to occupy Chicago. Most experts now admit that the failure of the Rock Island Line doomed the city months ago. The only question is how we got involved in the first place. Some people will bring up the "domino" theory, but that is the argument Lyndon Johnson used in Vietnam. It is possible that Illinois and the Midwestern states would pass to foreign control, but that might ultimately be for the best. It would at least be a sobering, highly educational experience.

Perhaps the newsmagazines are right that the United States is suffering a leadership crisis. But as regards foreign affairs this is no longer true. The leadership we are getting there is as excellent as it was 30 years ago. □

Brudnoy's Film Index

■ **And Now My Love:** The past, truly, is prologue, in this hokey but winning love story of two young people whose coming together is occasioned, more or less, by the story of their ancestors. We race through time from turn-of-the-century coquettishness to contemporary jet-set romance. One drop more of Kismet and the movie would be unbearable; as it is, it envelopes the viewer in its web of circumstance. By Claude Lelouch, who brought us *A Man and a Woman* in 1966.

■ **Brannigan:** They've poured John Wayne into his detective threads—one of his three basic outfits, alternating with his cowboy and his leatherneck suits—and plopped him down in darkest London in hot pursuit of a baddie. London survives, Wayne survives, crime survives, and admittedly the scenery and special effects are nice. The acting settles in the stomach like an English breakfast, rendering the viewer incapable of response. Only a necrophiliac could get nourishment from this deadening flop.

■ **Day of the Locust:** The Nathanael West classic about Hollywood's hasbeens and would-be-greats lavishly filmed and lovingly acted by Karen Black, Donald Sutherland, Burgess Meredith, and newcomer William Atherton. Each is splendid in his role, and the horrifying conclusion, reflecting West's morbid vision of fame's fleeting power and the mob's hysteria, is a *tour de force*.

■ **Donkey Skin:** A fairy tale about incest that is so saccharine it might rot your teeth. Nevertheless, if the sort of singing that infested *The Umbrellas of Cherbourg* some years back is your cup of treacle, this is for you. The young lovers are adorable, the fairy godmother's a hoot, and the colors are enchanting. This one is best seen tripping; with luck it will become a cult classic for hippies who've gone that route with Disney's *Fantasia*.

■ **The French Connection, II:** Gene Hackman is back as Popeye Doyle, the drug-chasing New York cop, here transplanted to France to tidy up the loose ends from installment #1. Needless to say, it is very messy indeed. There's a neat chase, and the chief villain *may* have survived for a third installment. The added twist this time: Popeye made into a junkie, undergoing one of the most gruesome cold turkey scenes on film. Not a sequel to treasure.

■ **Hearts and Minds:** The Oscar-winning documentary by Bert Schneider and Peter Davis, glorifying the Communist side in Vietnam and maliciously slamming the American. Everything is designed to distort reality so that only America is evil, only American generals are stupid, only America contributes to Vietnam's woes, only America's people are warmongers, only American politicos are dumb. They cheered wildly on Oscar-night when this monumental piece of propaganda won its award; *sic transit gloria Hollywood*.

■ **Love at the Top:** Jean-Louis Trintignant plays a man whose dream is "to have lots of money and sleep with many women." He triumphs, as does this odd but compelling French comedy. The women he sleeps with are lovely, especially Florinda Bolkan (of *A Brief Vacation*), and his crawl to the top is both funny and tragic. Paris never looked so chic, nor opportunism so casual.

■ **The Passenger:** Michelangelo Antonioni's latest, a chilling, truly magnificent peek into the problem of identity, with the usual Antonioni mysteries rolling out one after another. Jack Nicholson and Maria Schneider put more verve into this film than he usually does and than she did in *Last Tango in Paris*: They totally submerge themselves in their roles, and the result is absolutely first-rate acting. The conclusion is instant classic; it will no doubt be held up as a model of cinema genius for many years. Not to be missed.

■ **Rancho De Luxe:** Wall, podner, here's yo' little ole tale of the ooooold West —1974—with two greedy, eager, horny young bucks (Jeff Bridges and Sam Waterston) hot to make it big by cattle rustlin'. Almost, boys, almost. Along the way they romp and frolic with Elizabeth Ashley, Slim Pickens, and a variety of other characters. No great shakes as a movie, but light-hearted fun.

■ **The Reincarnation of Peter Proud:** *Déjà-vu* carried to its ultimate. A slick piece of trash designed to cash in on the dregs of the *Exorcist* mania, with the talented Michael Sarrazin struggling personfully against inane material. A slight bit of sex tease does little to erase the boredom of this predictable, overdrawn bit of occult silliness.

■ **Rosebud:** Leave it to Otto Preminger to take the fascinating possibilities of Arab terrorism as a cinema theme and turn it into sheer tedium. Peter O'Toole looks desperate to escape from his role as mastermind of international intelligence; the abducted chickies look no more inconvenienced than if they had been taken for a weekend of romance, and Richard Attenborough looks ridiculous as an Anglo-Arab messiah.

■ **The Silent Stranger:** A sukiyaki Western set in Japan in the 1880s, written by and produced by and starring one Tony Anthony, about whom you will hear little in coming years, unless a gargantuan lack of talent catches on. Our hero slaughters nearly half the baddies of old Japan (these all converse in high Nipponese grunts and groans), all to rescue a wee Japanese princess (who is about eight years old and somehow speaks perfect English) and find out the mystery of a miniature Japanese scroll. Hint: it isn't one of the Emperor's missing tape transcripts.

■ **The Yakuza:** Nippon once more, this time today's industrialized Japan, with the Oriental Mafia battling Robert Mitchum. Lots of dramatic confrontations, discourses on "honor" and "duty" and other catchy concepts. The location shots are fine; the acting's heavy, and Mitchum is excellent in a fairly ludicrous role. □

EDITORIAL
(continued from page 4)

Of all the wonders that the pols work, the ones that I especially do not want to know about are those that they work under the rubric of reform. As the eminent James Q. Wilson asserted in the May number of this family magazine, reform "means to improve by alteration, to abolish abuse or malpractice; 'a reform' is a change for the better, an improvement in social, moral, or political conditions." Now how many "reforms" in recent years have comported with that definition? Much of the civil rights legislation of the middle 1960s was admirable reform to be sure, but as the years have worn on the reforms have degenerated into quotas, coercive busing, and a foul policy of "affirmative action" that threatens to return this democracy to the glories of feudalism and an ascriptive society. Then there are the campaign "reforms," at least one of which is so obviously unconstitutional that men as different as James Buckley and Eugene McCarthy joined forces to contest it, and the Department of Justice hesitates to defend it. Yet during its nonsensical gestation on the floor of Congress it was bandied about both by politicians and by journalists as a notable improvement if not an actual panacea.

What is reform? Reform is a tactic resorted to by misologists to preclude debate. It is a preemptive strike against thoughtful analysis. It is a word exuding such connotative bliss that it sanctifies almost any deed no matter how low or hollow. Rarely have men been able to resist let alone debate a policy once it is classified as a reform. In democratic societies it is a kind of sacred seal, which—once accorded to a group or a proposal—makes them admirable and almost unassailable. Had the Mafiosi, rather than the League of Women Voters, arranged to have themselves described as a reform movement, I have no doubt that the Brotherhood would now hold an honored place in American life. The Capone era would be eulogized as an auspicious precursor to the New Deal, *The Godfather* would be produced by the American Bicentennial Administration, and many a pol would be sweating after the endorsement of his local Black Hand chapter. The FBI would have sunk even lower in the *New York Times'* esteem.

Political scientists note that reform is generally used against mossbacks; what they generally neglect to note is that it is often used *by* petty tyrants. How else does one describe the reformers who breathed life into Prohibition, the Mann Act, the Selective Service System, and the income tax? How else to describe the marplots who have turned the American automobile into a vehicle approximating the efficiency, the cost, and, of course, the safety, of a bulldozer? Are not reformers behind the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Trade Commission, and various minimum wage and rent commissions throughout the land of the free? All of these reformers promised to better the lot of the plain folk and scotch villainy. In most cases all they have accomplished is increased travail for the plain folk while establishing a profitable alliance between the reformer and the reformed.

It is all just another area of political behavior about which I would rather not know. If the pols were serious about improving our condition, there are myriads of improvements they might hammer into policy. And lest the reader think I am purely negative in my commentary I shall mention one of my favorite reforms by way of ending this scholarly critique and by way of nailing down my point that pols are rascals; for though my reform is eminently practical, useful, and democratic, I guarantee that it will not attract a sniff from Capitol Hill.

Every politician in the land agrees that politicians should be responsible to the people and each politician is forever attempting to one-up his fellow in testifying to his slavish adherence to the people's will, yet I have never heard a politician condemn the curious chronological gulf between the date on which the politician seeks the electorate's approval and the date on which the electorate is presented with the bill for the politician's highjinks. Election day is always about as far removed from income tax day as the calendar will allow. Surely nothing would bring the politician's behavior more closely under the scrutiny of the electorate and therefore make him more responsible to the electorate than to make election day and income tax day one and the same. I therefore propose that federal taxes be paid on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of every November. There you have it, a reform worthy of John Gardner at his best, a reform brilliant in its democratic allure, and a reform that will excite about as much enthusiasm in the mind of the average Congressman as a plan to administer breathalizer tests on the solons before they wobble into the Capitol.

Beyond a hearty guffaw there is little good the average American can realize from his knowledge of politics as practiced in this Republic. The more we know the more we are degraded. Therefore I believe the people ought not to know; and if laughter is what we are after we can always do graduate work at one of the great universities. □

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"Whom the gods destroy, they first make mad." —Euripides

Current Wisdom

NEOTERICISMS: The very latest in advanced thought carefully excavated from the pages of the *New York Review of Books*, a magazine of cleverness:

The failed experiment is considered a permanent fixture, so that even the daring speculator talks of reforming the prisons when he should be considering their abolition. If there is any more disastrous survivor of the Enlightenment still gasping at a death-like life, I do not know where to find it.

—*New York Review of Books*
April 3, 1975

SEXUAL EMANCIPATION: Reassuring news from the Latin American underworld, an equal opportunity employer:

Unlike Mafia wives who stay in the kitchen and cook lasagna, women have a prominent place in Latin America's illicit drug traffic, filling every role from courier to godmother of criminal organizations, according to American drug-enforcement officials.

—*"A Woman's Accent"*
by Mary Daniels
United Features, May 7, 1975

THE GORY DETAILS: Mr. Garry Wills, elevated spirit, describes another poetic moment experienced by one of his literary colleagues:

Tom Wicker was summoned abruptly down into this sewer, as an "observer" at the standoff between rioting prisoners and their guards in upstate New York. He came to look, and stayed to vomit, and vowed to write—and has now written, almost literally in blood....

—*New York Review of Books*
April 3, 1975

DEPT. OF ADVANCED THOUGHT: A Mr. Larry L. King, *New Times'* leading authority on international relations, delivers up a new foreign policy for Arkansas:

We must come to understand that it really doesn't matter whether Park or Kim rule as despots over the whole of Korea. It is not a choice of supporting Freedom over Slavery, no matter what Dr. Kizzinger learned at the knee of John Foster Dulles. These are new times and history makes new waves. Hereafter, when North fights South, let America go fishing—unless the battles pit the domestic Carolinas or Dakotas against each other.

—*New Times*
May 30, 1975

CEREBRATIONS: A brilliantly analytical gust from movie producer Bert Schneider, another genius from Hollywood's rising generation of metaphysicians:

A few critics have charged that "Hearts and Minds" is a propaganda film, one-sided in its attack on American policy in Vietnam. Schneider bridles at these criticisms: "I don't understand what that means. Is Picasso's 'Guernica' Communist propaganda? If I say the sun comes up in the east and sets in the west, and we discover that Karl Marx also said that, am I a tool of the Communists? I used to see that kind of thing when the McCarthy investigations were taking place—guilt by association."

—*New York Times*
May 4, 1975

QUALITY OF LIFE DEPT.: Shana Alexander, resident sage of *Newsweek* magazine, glows, as she rattles off the benefits of life in a Red paradise, benefits about equal to the benefits of life in any American penitentiary:

If we know one thing about the government founded by Ho Chi Minh, it is that its social services are excellent: good health care, day care, and educational programs abound, especially for the poor.

—*Newsweek*
April 28, 1975

OLD FAITHFUL: Applause for American valor from the redoubtable *Nation*, a journal dedicated to the proposition that, in foreign policy, mountains are best made into molehills:

By far the most troublesome aspect of the *Mayaguez* action has been the jubilant, backslapping response it evoked. Congress was virtually unanimous in its approval (there were some conspicuous exceptions, Sen. Gaylord Nelson for one); it took the Senate four hours to voice its commendations, with the conservatives being the most laudatory. As for the public, it has been almost as enthusiastic as Ford and Kissinger, who have been filmed congratulating each other and patting themselves on the back in a manner reminiscent of a team of freshmen wrestlers after their first intercollegiate victory. The reaction suggests that we have learned little from our experience in Indochina; on the contrary, the defeat of United States policy in Vietnam seems to have evoked a jingoistic mood which, as long as it lasts, is likely to encourage future follies.

—*The Nation*
May 31, 1975

HE-MAN POLITICS: The authentic achievements of 30 postgraduates of good governmentism, as chronicled by *New Times*, the lively journal of silver-spooned urban guerrillas:

Whatever you think of their politics, a look at the record convinces you that the Weather Underground can no longer be dismissed as post-graduate dilettantes. They went underground, about 30 of them, in the winter of 1969-70, most of them with heavy assault and conspiracy charges hanging over them. They didn't go underground to hide out, the way, a generation before, the leaders of the Communist party hid when they went underground in the early '50s to escape Smith Act prosecutions. The Weather People went underground to conduct a campaign of sabotage against symbols of American power, but they had more in mind than blowing up buildings. They wanted to build up a permanent underground-based political party and support system—the first of its kind in America. They wanted to disprove the popular assumption that the white radical movements of the '60s all died on January 1, 1970. And they wanted to blow up the myth of FBI invincibility.

They've succeeded. The U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, New York City Police Headquarters, I.T.T., the State Department. They've claimed credit for these and 20 other bombings over the past five years, many of the claims documented with fingerprinted communiqués containing convincing details and postmarks. Most of these bombings have followed immediately upon such events as the killing of George Jackson, the bombing of Hanoi, the coup in Chile. The swiftness of such "symbolic retaliation," as they call it, suggests that the Weather Underground has developed an ability to communicate coast-to-coast among its cells, coordinate complex sabotage schemes against closely guarded targets at a moment's notice and still preserve security.

—*New Times*
May 30, 1975

INTELLECTUAL DIGEST: Intellectual news from Oak Park, Illinois, where the WCTU drinking fountain has been replaced by the Rev. Gerald L. Krick:

While everyone else is celebrating Mother's Day Sunday, the Unitarian-Universalist Church of Oak Park will turn things around and celebrate Non-Mother's Day.

The Rev. Gerald R. Krick said Friday, "The time has come to honor those women who have not had children....

"For too long childless women have been made to feel that they were inferior and unnatural....

"Mother's Day is one of the worst times for such women. On this day their

so-called inadequacy is made to stand out like a missing leg.

"The time has come to celebrate non-Mother's Day and to recognize those whose social conscience has persuaded them not to have children.

"I don't have anything against mothers but I do have something against a society that forces or encourages them to become mothers."

—*United Press International*
May 10, 1975

MISSION TO PEKING: Shirley MacLaine, *ingenue terrible*, appraises freedom's auspicious metamorphosis in Mao's China, a republic without flies:

"The notion of freedom was suddenly suspect; in American terms, there were no freedoms here of the variety we cherished: no freedom to publish, no opposition of political parties, no freedom to write books or create works of art. But there were other freedoms: freedom from starvation, discrimination, exploitation, slavery and early death."

—*You Can Get There from Here*

NORMATIVE NOODLES: Andrew Kopkind, typical journalist, plumbs American opinion on a recent Bicentennial jamboree, interviewing a typical American on a typical page of the amazing *New York Review of Books*:

So far, as we enter the Bicentennial year, the American Revolution seems as dormant as a dinosaur's egg, although it will take some nerve for anyone to admit it. Only one person I spoke with in the week before the beginning in Boston called it that way. Representative Elaine Noble, a lesbian feminist who was elected last year to the Great and General Court of Massachusetts, was posing for a Bicentennial film crew in the Governor's Office of the State House. She stood under a portrait of Sam Adams, an earlier governor.

"What do you think of the things going on this weekend?" I asked her. "Are you going to be out at Concord?"

"Hell no," she replied. "I'm going to Cincinnati."

—*New York Review of Books*
May 15, 1975

THE ASS SPEAKETH: Honest Edward launches another beauty:

"Health care in America is restricted to the privileged few."

—Senator Edward Kennedy,
speaking before the National
Conference on Rural America,
Washington, D.C., April 15, 1975

CHURCH MOUSE: Magisterial pronouncement of Senator Frank Church, the new Borah:

"It is the CIA, not the Russian KGB, that is feared all over the world, and this is undermining the legitimate foreign policy efforts of the United States."

—*New York Times*
May 18, 1975

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